

Current History



THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

West Europe Today and Tomorrow

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Coming Next Month

What do the INDIAN people think of us? How do Americans look to the WEST EUROPEANS, the BRITISH, the AFRICANS? How about the RUSSIANS, the EGYPTIANS, the JAPANESE? And our Good Neighbors in LATIN AMERICA?

Because we feel that it is important to see ourselves as others see us, we have asked outstanding foreign scholars to join in an issue called *THE WORLD LOOKS AT AMERICA*, to be published next month.

Correspondence and cables between here and Moscow assure us that *Boris Izakov*, editor of *International Affairs* (Moscow), will write for us on contemporary Russian attitudes toward the United States. *A. L. Rowse* of All Souls College, Oxford, author of the new book, *The Early Churchills*, will write on English views; *German Arciniegas*, well-known author and scholar and Professor of Spanish at Columbia University, will describe Latin American reactions to us. A cable from Cairo informs us that we can count on an essay from Egypt's Minister of Cultural Affairs, *Hussein Monés*. While visiting in the United States, *Tom Mboya*, General Secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor, will describe African attitudes. From Paris, *Guy Métraux* of the International Commission for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind, is going to analyze West European opinion. *M. V. Kamath* of the Press Trust of India will write about the viewpoint of his country; *Kazuo Kawai*, former editor of the *Nippon Times* and Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, will describe Japan's reaction to the United States.

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"A closer and more integrated North Atlantic Community" is "the safest guarantee against the revival of that anti-Western or self-centered spirit which in the last 100 years has wreaked so much havoc politically, and above all, spiritually, in Germany, and through Germany in the free world."

Germany in the New Europe

BY HANS KOHN

Professor of History, City College of New York

EUROPE ten years ago, in 1946, was in the throes of the aftermath of the intellectually, socially, and economically most devastating war engulfing the whole of the continent. Out of this chaos a new order and a new prosperity have emerged in the astonishingly brief space of a decade. Order and prosperity are today to be found everywhere in the free countries of Europe, outside the totalitarian orbit which includes the whole of Europe east of the Elbe, the Alps, and the Adriatic Sea on the one hand, and the Pyrenean Peninsula.

None of the countries of free Europe has made a more dramatic recovery than the German Federal Republic. Ten years ago there was no German state whatsoever, no German administration or government existed, and the rubble and ruin of the German cities offered examples of ghastly poverty and hopelessness. Today the German Federal Republic represents the most modern state the German people have ever achieved, and the German population has one of the highest standards of living in contemporary Europe.

This happy turn of events is partly due to the innate efficiency and discipline of the Germans, but it is also largely due to American foreign and economic policy, exemplified in NATO and in the Marshall Plan,

which gave to free Europe military and economic security for the most difficult transitional period of the last decade.

In spite of the catastrophe which overtook Germany in 1945, a catastrophe infinitely greater than that of 1918—or perhaps on account of this catastrophe—Germany offered during the last decade a much more orderly spectacle than she offered in the ten years following 1918. The Weimar Republic was plagued by a plethora of revolutionary and subversive movements of all kinds, by the fanatic deeds of terrorist patriots, by the refusal of parts of the high civil service to comply with the ideas and regulations of the new regime. Nothing like that has happened in the ten years following 1945.

Yet the Germans of the German Federal Republic are presented with an issue of national importance and of a gravity unknown after 1918. In 1918, Germany lost some territories which were largely inhabited by non-Germans, and the German minorities living there were of course allowed to stay and enjoy, in most cases actually, in a few cases perhaps only theoretically, full civic and political equality.

In 1945 millions of Germans were driven out of homes where their ancestors had been settled, worked and died, for many

centuries, and these territories were resettled by non-Germanic populations. Of the remainder of Germany, about one-fourth was turned into a Communist state and shared the fate of the Eastern European lands.

The issue of a reunion of the two Germanies—the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic—and the resettlement of the expelled Germans in their homes are very serious issues, infinitely more serious than the two issues plaguing Germany after 1918, the wrongs of the Treaty of Versailles and the abnormality of what was called by the Germans the Polish Corridor. These were largely fictitious, yet they were deeply felt issues which inflamed German nationalism. And the flames, not extinguished by energetic action from the West or by German liberals, caused the conflagration of the 1930's. The present issue is a legitimate and serious one, yet it is not deeply felt, it does not feed the flames of German nationalism, and as far as the future can be foreseen, it will not by itself cause a conflagration.

Compared with any preceding period in the last 150 years, the German Federal Republic, which emerged from the unprecedented German catastrophe of Naziism and from the equally unprecedented German material catastrophe of the loss of the second German world war, contains elements of stability which presage well for the future of Germany and of Europe. Yet the German Federal Republic, like so many other European states, finds itself today in a stage of transition.

THE TRANSITION

The elections of September, 1953, turned into a vote of confidence for the leadership of Dr. Konrad Adenauer, the most pro-Western chancellor Germany had for a very long time. He became the head of a coalition which seemed firmly entrenched and commanded a secure majority. In the last months this majority has been shaken, there appear deep cleavages in the coalition, and the firm grip of the chancellor, who is now an octogenarian, is visibly slipping.

Under these circumstances, the coming

elections of September, 1957, seem to leave the field wide open for new leadership. As in other European states, the older generation, the generation of the men who grew up in the nineteenth century, and who determined Europe's future in the years immediately following 1945—the generation of Churchill, Attlee, de Gasperi, Adenauer—is fast receding from the stage of history. The question of succession is everywhere posed, not only in Germany. In Germany proper the question can be formulated thus: after Adenauer, what?

Adenauer was not an easy taskmaster. A man of apparently autocratic temper and by training an administrator and not a parliamentarian, he has nevertheless accomplished much: the Germans, a people without a strong or highly esteemed parliamentary tradition, have become accustomed to the game of parliamentary life; and Bonn, a most improbable site for a capital, is slowly affirming its position. More important, under Adenauer's leadership, the Germans have for the first time in their modern history associated themselves unquestioningly with the West. They have renounced, at least for the time being, the game which they played under the Weimar Republic, of regarding themselves either as a spiritual bastion against the West or playing a self-centered policy of balance between East and West.

These are Adenauer's lasting achievements, whatever his many shortcomings may be; these are his great services to Germany and to the West; these perhaps will make him appear one day a more constructive statesman (though certainly not so great a personality) than Bismarck. Many critics will, not without some justification, object to Dr. Adenauer for his having excluded one of the two great Western-oriented parties in Germany, the Social Democrats, from participation in his administration, and for having relied exclusively on his own Christian Democratic Union.

Until very recently this attitude seemed to relegate the Social Democratic Party to a permanent minority position, a very regrettable fact for democracy and the West. But perhaps it was good that in the first years of the new Germany a Western-oriented party

formed the opposition. Had both Western-oriented parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democrats, formed a coalition government from the beginning, the role of the opposition would have fallen upon non-Western-oriented, democratically unreliable parties, and a dangerous situation could have arisen.

Dr. Adenauer has successfully consolidated the German Federal Republic in close co-operation with the West. With this success, the stage has been set for a greater flexibility of a policy which threatened to become too rigid. Now with the split in the coalition which has supported Dr. Adenauer, with the departure of the Free Democratic Party and of the Refugee Party (B.H.E., *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten*), new coalitions are possible in the coming elections. These may insure to the Social Democrats their share in a future government and thus end their isolation. With that the temper of the German Social Democrats will change.

In no democracy, as is well known from the case of the United States, is it desirable that any one party should too long and too exclusively be entrusted with the task of administration. The Christian Democratic Union in Germany seemed as firmly entrenched as the Democratic Party in the United States at the height of the popularity of the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt. It is certainly in the interests of the development of German democracy that the struggle for leadership in the German Federal Republic become much more open. The German parliamentary system will then more closely approximate that of the Anglo-American countries. Then politics will consist of a struggle between the "ins" and the "outs," and no longer of bitter hostility between irreconcilable ideologies.

TRIUMPH OF MODERATION

For it is one of the great achievements of the German Federal Republic, which Adenauer probably did not intend, that the Germans today are far less addicted to metaphysics, to *Weltanschauung* than they formerly were and boasted to be; that they have become sober and practical; that they

think—though they do naturally not always talk—in the framework of political and social realities instead of daring nationalist desirabilities.

The recent congress of the German Social Democratic Party, which met in Munich in July, ended with a full victory of the moderate wing. The leader of the German Social Democratic Party, Ollenhauer, had the difficult task of carrying a program that could be a platform for an opposition party and at the same time for a governmental party. He sharply rejected any popular front policy, insisted on the unbridgeable gulf between a free parliamentary democracy and the Communist dictatorship presented in the form of a people's democracy, and repeated that the problem of German reunion could not be solved by negotiations between the German Federal Republic (Bonn) and the German Democratic Republic (Pankow).

This seems to us the decisive question for Germany's future, whether Western Germany and its democratic regime should be regarded as only a provisional regime on a par with the Communist-dominated Pankow regime, or whether it is the free German state which has to fulfill a twofold task: to preserve its own liberty and finally to regain liberty for the Soviet zone. The latter may be a distant goal, which perhaps can be solved only with the restitution of liberty in other Communist-dominated lands like Poland and Czechoslovakia. The indispensable precondition for it is the continued existence of the German Federal Republic, its growing strength, its more deeply rooted democratic liberty, its ever-closer integration with the West.

This integration with the West found its first formal expression in Germany's entrance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Theoretically the Social Democrats are still against Germany's membership in NATO and against the introduction of universal military service in Germany. This doctrinaire attitude, understandable and even legitimate in the opposition, may change.

It was one of the greatest mistakes of the Social Democrats under the Weimar Republic that they did not actively participate

in the building of the Weimar army for doctrinaire reasons, and that they thus left this indispensable instrument of power in the hands of the enemies not only of social democracy, but of democracy and of the West.

Today the situation is different. After 1918, most Germans desired the restoration of Germany's armed power; and their love of the uniform and of the paraphernalia of militarism had survived the non-accepted and non-believed defeat of 1918 and perhaps even gained in ardor. Today this love has gone. German youth, including the veterans of the last war, men now in their thirties, reject the former adoration of the army. The new German armed forces will play the role which armed forces play in the English-speaking countries.

The danger of a renewed halo over the army is at present entirely negligible. A more realistic attitude on the part of the German Social Democrats, their active participation in building up the spirit and the body of the new German armed forces will completely remove the danger. On July 7, the parliament of the German Federal Republic accepted the military service bill with 270 against 166 votes after a long and heated discussion. Nobody can read the speeches without being impressed by the high level of the discussion, and of German parliamentary life in general. In his concluding words, the Speaker of the House tried to express what both parties, those who had accepted and those who had rejected the bill, had in common:

It must never happen again that the world fears or distrusts us. If the world does not love us, it should at least respect us and it should trust the new Germany.

For the future of Europe, of the West, and above all, of Germany, the development of NATO is of utmost importance. NATO has started as a military alliance in an emergency. As such it has fulfilled its task remarkably well. It has acted as a shield behind which free Europe and free Germany could consolidate themselves. But NATO is potentially much more than a military alliance, and it can continue to secure the peace and prosperity of free Europe and of free Germany in the years ahead only if it becomes more than a military alliance, a firm union of peoples who share similar fundamental attitudes toward individual liberty and parliamentary representation and who wish to cooperate for the strengthening of their free institutions and their economic life.

Such a closer and more integrated North Atlantic community is perhaps for no other nation as important as for Germany. For it is the safest guarantee against the revival of that anti-Western or self-centered spirit which in the last 100 years has wreaked so much havoc, politically, and above all, spiritually, in Germany, and through Germany in the free world.

Hans Kohn spent the last year on sabbatical leave doing research at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and at Harvard University for his Age of Nationalism, A History of National Movements and Ideas, Mainly in Europe 1789-1920, and finishing American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay. His most recent book is Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example which was published in an American edition in October, 1956.

“... Preach, my dear sir, a crusade against ignorance; establish and improve the law for educating the common people. Let our countrymen know, that the people alone can protect us against these evils, and that the tax which will be paid for this purpose is not more than the thousandth part of what will be paid to kings, priests and nobles, who will rise up among us if we leave the people in ignorance.”

Thomas Jefferson in a letter to George Wythe, August 13, 1786.

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Noting that in France "most crucial problems divide the Assembly and the country into almost equal halves," this author believes that for France "there is probably no cure except an overwhelming dose of prosperity."

France After NATO

By EDWARD W. FOX

Associate Professor of History, Cornell University

THE FUTURE of the Fourth French Republic was neither clear nor bright before Colonel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez canal on last July 26. Inextricably emmeshed in its second major colonial war (in a scant ten years' existence) apparently unable to eliminate the threat of bankruptcy by inflation, and regarded (at least in the United States) as the problem child of the family of the Western allies, the Fourth Republic was also the subject of grave concern—when not the object of open derision or hostility—among the French themselves.

A complete and balanced assessment of the French record would, it is true, need to include a list of solid achievements which have recently culminated in a pleasant flush of that prosperity which we Americans are so prone to take as a divine seal of approval on our own national efforts. Even so, the most optimistic observer would have been sobered by the hazards which lay in the Republic's path.

Now, barely a month after Colonel Nasser's *coup* put a new and sinister meaning into the title, "Europe after NATO," the future of France appears even more difficult and dangerous. Although it is still possible, it seems quite unlikely that NATO will be

revived and revised in a manner to compensate for the French defeat. It also seems unlikely but not quite impossible that the French will resort to armed intervention with all its incalculable risks.

The probability, however, is that France will find herself, shorn of her last shreds of prestige in the Arab world, with her petroleum jugular exposed to Nasser's whim, still facing the grim necessity of pacifying or evacuating Algeria. Whatever line of action the French adopt, they are almost certain to accompany it with what Secretary of State Dulles, with characteristic infelicity, once referred to as "an agonizing reappraisal" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Not a few Frenchmen are already urging the irrefutable point that NATO, while costing their country much, has not only failed to aid but has actually hampered the military defense of French interests. It would not be surprising if a movement developed to abandon a costly and pretentious system of defense that was effectively circumvented by nothing more formidable than the oratorical violence of a "dictator's apprentice." But even if they should consign NATO to the same scrap heap of delusory defenses of democracy on which the Maginot Line was dumped some 16 years ago, the French will find themselves still facing all the old problems which have plagued them since the Liberation.

It would, moreover, be naive to proceed to a detached analysis of the present political situation without recognizing the possibility that the catastrophic defeat which seems to impend in Africa could precipitate some form of revolutionary *coup* in France. The

Edward W. Fox studied and taught at Harvard before joining the faculty at Cornell. He has just returned from a fifteen month stay in France where he has been continuing his study of recent French history and politics.

war in Indo-china, although never popular, was accepted for several years as the nation's contribution to the defense of the West. The war in Algeria, which was deeply unpopular last fall and winter, has gradually come to be accepted as a legitimate and necessary struggle for national defense. Defeat would come as a bitter, personal blow to a large part of the population; but it would be idle to speculate on the precise form popular reaction would take.

What can be considered with profit is the nature of the continuing crisis that will still confront the government of France after the fate of North Africa is settled. With enough over-simplification to make the subject intelligible in brief compass the crisis might be described as a chronic instability of the government and the *franc*. Paradoxically, this all but chaotic lack of stability produces a crippling political paralysis which the French themselves call *immobilisme*. This phenomenon has encouraged in observers from the Anglo-Saxon democracies their ever latent suspicion that the French are inherently incapable of self-government and has fostered among the French a distrust of their parliamentary institutions.

Scrutiny of, and reflection upon, the recent record, however, do not necessarily confirm these reactions. That a procession of ministries has failed to make appreciable progress in the resolution of the array of problems which plague the country may be due not so much to defects of national character or institutions as to the fact that the problems are so interlocked as to make their separation and seriatim solution all but impossible.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The complexity of the task confronting the ministers may be suggested by the difficulty of disentangling the principal factors for purposes of analysis. The most practical starting point would seem to be the budget. Virtually no salutary action can be taken without additional expenditure and no expenses can be added to the already unbalanced budget without increasing the risk of explosive inflation.

The frustrating character of the situation

is well illustrated by the current crisis in housing. Extensive war damage added to a quarter century of neglect left France after the Liberation with an acute housing shortage. So far the best governmental efforts at reconstruction, although gradually healing the open wounds of war, have failed to keep ahead of the combined obsolescence and population increase. As a result housing has become an acute social, political and even moral problem for the entire country but one sufficiently concrete to seem susceptible of solution.

To double or treble the present construction program, however, would require a corresponding increase in capital investment. Since such an additional outlay would exceed the government's resources, the only hope would be to tap private capital, an almost impossible task in view of the state control which holds rents below a level that would pay a fair return. One courageous minister of reconstruction wished to relax the controls to provide an incentive for private investment, but his colleagues felt that such a move was far too dangerous in the existing condition of acute scarcity. The present morbid situation will probably persist until the appearance of a reserve in the budget makes effective action practical.

This example inevitably points to the chronic inflation as the critical weakness of France. Why, it is then necessary to ask, can't the currency be reinforced by an increase of income and reduction of expenses? Throughout the nineteenth century, the *franc* was as solid as any currency in the world. The first unbalanced budgets were the product of the arms race that preceded the first World War; and serious inflation resulted from the decision to finance that war largely through loans rather than by the severe taxation adopted by the British.

From that time to this, French governments have repeatedly sacrificed the *franc* rather than face up to unpleasant financial situations. The obligations incurred by passage of the major blocs of social legislation, for example, were met at least in part by depreciation of the currency. The folly, even iniquity, of such a practice is regularly pointed out. What is less often and less critically considered is whether the country's

resources have been in fact equal to her inescapable commitments of national defense and social security.

There can be no question, in any case, that the one large item which regularly upsets the balance of the budget is the appropriation for the armed forces. Commitments to NATO and involvement in the colonial wars have prevented resolution of the problem by a simple reduction of military expenses. (It should be recalled, however, that M. Mendès-France rested his case for the liquidation of the war in Indo-china on this budgetary argument.)

Nor is there any other section of the budget that offers a comparable possibility of effective reduction. The subsidy of alcohol, for example, which is an open scandal, should certainly be eliminated but as much on moral as fiscal grounds. For the rest, the many obvious reforms in the administrative services would probably cost as much as they would save, at least in the short run.

All of this would seem to add up to the probability that if the French are driven out of Africa, they will ask themselves why they have been struggling for years to share the burdens of collective defense and why they should continue to do so? Nor, if the present "thaw" in the Cold War continues, will it be difficult to guess their answer.

If retrenchment does not promise an easy solution, the possibility of increasing the state's revenues should be explored, particularly since it is a matter of common misinformation that the French manage to evade most taxes. The fact, of course, is that the French government actually collects in taxes as large a portion of the net national income as any other free state today. According to the method of computation used, it can be demonstrated that the per cent of the national income paid in taxes is either just below or somewhat higher than in Great Britain and the United States.

And if social security payments are included in the tax total (a debatable point) it reaches 50 per cent of the net income. The rule of thumb offered by Professor Colin Clark, and widely accepted, is that a state can not expect to collect substantially more than 25 per cent over an extended period of

time without running the risk of serious repercussions.

It would appear, therefore, that the French are already approaching the practical limits of taxation; but that is not to say that their tax system is satisfactory. By common consent it is in urgent need of reform to simplify the antiquated and cumbersome procedures and equalize the burden. But if more revenue must be found it had better be sought through building up the national income. Fiscal salvation for the country may well lie in the direction allegedly offered to discontented Frenchmen by Guizot in his famous advice, "*Enrichissez-vous!*"

The old belief that France is a rich country is out of date and seriously misleading. France is rich in the sense that most of her regions produce abundant supplies of excellent food, and before the industrial revolution food constituted wealth. Since the introduction of heavy industry, however, great wealth has almost always derived from major coal deposits; and although France possesses important industrial resources, her supplies of coal are marginal.

Whether or not this relative lack of coal is accepted as a satisfactory explanation of French failure to keep up with Germany or Great Britain, the fact should not be overlooked that France has never achieved the industrial power nor disposed of the vast capital reserves of the other major powers.

POUJADISTS EXPLAINED

Not only is France incompletely, it is unevenly, industrialized, a condition which largely explains the phenomenal success of Pierre Poujade and his followers in the last national election. The overwhelming bulk of modern industry, and modern farming too, lies in the northeastern third of the country above an imaginary line from Le Havre to Pontallier. A large number of people, perhaps a third of the population, continues to exist on the fringes of the modern monetary economy; and it is the subsistence peasants, the small shopkeepers and artisans who compose this group who constitute the large mass of tax evaders.

The Ministry of Finance makes no serious effort to collect taxes from the small peasants

on the theory that collection would cost more than it would produce in revenue. Efforts to enforce tax collection in rural villages, it should be added, produced the Poujade revolt. Many *Poujadists* quite simply cannot scrape together the money to pay taxes; the issue between them and the government, therefore, can be reduced to the question of whether or not they have the right to live outside the monetary economy.

The tax collectors who seize the valueless furnishings of their tiny shops are insisting, in effect, that the delinquent owners exchange their traditional—and by no means unpleasant way of life—for gainful employment in the new industrial economy.

This shopkeeper's mentality finds a strange parallel in the *esprit* of the factory owners and businessmen who are traditionally reluctant to expand or improve a successful enterprise. Observation of these attitudes has led to the development of a school of historical interpretation based on the assumption that a characteristic attitude toward business has held the normal economic progress of the country in check.

It is quite possible, however, that businessmen with the same instincts were not lacking in other countries but were eliminated by alternate shocks of depression and floods of new wealth. These France was not sufficiently industrialized to experience to the same degree. Survivors of an earlier economic age constitute a reactionary political nucleus, but there is no reason to suppose that they, in their turn, would not be dislodged and dissolved by a rising tide of wealth. The important problem is to find the necessary capital to complete the industrial revolution. A beginning has been made with the Monnet Plan but more remains to be done as soon as the government can provide the credits.

PROBLEMS OF POLITICS

Ministerial instability, even more than economic weakness, has characterized the current regime for most observers who have come increasingly to find in it the cause, rather than a symptom, of the crisis. This conviction has produced a campaign for constitutional reform which is reaching

major proportions and which runs the gamut from proposals for simple electoral revision to demands for the calling of the Estates General (that is, a full constitutional convention). There seems to be little doubt that a majority of the electorate would favor substituting a simple direct form of suffrage for the present complex system based on limited proportional representation.

The other proposed changes are aimed primarily at strengthening the government either by facilitating dissolution of the Assembly or by reinforcing the position and tenure of the ministry. To make dissolution easier would probably be salutary; to bolster the executive office with a fixed term or by a national election would almost certainly be to institute a more or less disguised dictatorship. The casual manner in which such measures have been urged provides a measure of the current disillusion and despair.

In spite of the gathering storm of criticism, there is more than a possibility that the existing constitution is sound. For one thing, a point surprisingly neglected by scholars, it is the product of organic historical development; for another, it reflects the political complexion of the country with considerable accuracy.

To try to correct the political errors of the community by manipulating constitutional machinery is apt to prove dangerous. For the moment at least, it seems unlikely that such large executive powers would be voted in a vacuum; that they might be voted to an individual leader in an emergency is far from impossible.

Even the remote possibility of a dictatorship inevitably raises the subject of political parties and leaders. There are not at the moment any would-be dictators in view who would appear to have the slightest chance of seizing power by a *coup d'état*. Pierre Poujade has almost certainly been seriously overrated. The only other man of the Right sometimes mentioned as a candidate is the Marshal Juin. A blunt soldier with no political finesse and no party of his own, he does not look so threatening as the Left tries to paint him. On the Left the only figure of sufficient stature is Mendès-France but his considerable popularity of last winter has been largely dissipated by enforced in-

action and an astonishingly vicious and effective smear campaign. He is, however, the kind of man who could reemerge in a desperate situation. The only statesman that it is possible to imagine being drafted into emergency powers is General de Gaulle, and even he, with his prestige largely restored, would provoke vigorous opposition on the Left. In fact it is still difficult to envisage the French deliberately entrusting their fate to a single ruler.

It is, of course, the chaotic multi-party system which has given rise to thoughts of dictatorship and which leaves many observers with a feeling of hopelessness about the entire political situation. But the chaos is more apparent than real; not only are the innumerable parties effectively grouped into six major blocs but the blocs themselves tend to merge into coalitions of Right and Left.

French political scientists regularly speak of the parties of "movement" and of "order." It is true that the composition of these super groups often shifts with the question at issue; yet much more important is the fact that most crucial problems divide the Assembly and the country into almost equal halves. The characteristic paralysis of French government is basically the product of the impasse between evenly balanced forces.

That France is divided against herself has become a truism. The divisive factor, however, is not (as is so often alleged) the great Revolution of 1789 but the industrial revolution. Virtually all Frenchmen, including the pretender to the throne, are heirs of the Revolution, but somewhere near half of them feel (perhaps mistakenly) that their security is threatened by economic progress.

For this situation there is probably no cure except an overwhelming dose of prosperity. And it is for this reason that the forces of resistance have unleashed their hysterical campaign of hate and slander against M. Mendès-France precisely because they see in him the one man who might lead France out of her present economic impasse. It is also

for this reason that there will be little prospect of important improvement until the French are relieved of their crushing military burden and free to concentrate their resources on the development of the country.

Finally, economic salvation will require, in addition to available capital, an extension of the economic frontiers of the country. With the disintegration of the empire this will be all the more urgent. And the obvious path to follow would seem to be that indicated by the Coal-Steel Pool. For the French, however, union in a narrowly continental Europe is a shotgun wedding with the bully who did them wrong. Nor has this feeling been assuaged by the recent Saar election in which unrepentent Nazis dominated the scene without any reproof from Bonn, or (on a much lesser scale) the revealing incident of the Cannes festival in which the German government requested the withdrawal of a documentary-type film on concentration camps, with the explanation that it might be offensive to some Germans!

Europe, as a political, social or economic concept cannot be confined to the peninsula of Asia which juts out into the Atlantic. The French, as Europeans, have understood this fact much better than we Americans. It is, of course, this narrow literal-mindedness that accounts for our naively self-righteous anti-colonial policies. We might do well to compare this moral fetish with our earlier devotion to the doctrine of self-determination which, however obviously right, always played into the hands of the forces of evil.

We are convinced that the French can no longer live cooped up in France and are inclined to be impatient with their reluctance to join a larger community. What we must come to realize is that it is just about as hopeless for them to try to live confined in geographical Europe. What is needed is a community as large as the concept of Europe and it is tempting to speculate on the possibility that NATO might be turned into such a commonwealth.

"Whereas other nations are continually making alliances, breaking them, and then renewing them, the Utopians make no alliances with any nation. If nature, they say, will not make man friendly with man, will an alliance do so? Will a man who scorns nature respect mere words?" Thomas More, *Utopia*

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"... There is little doubt that by careful planning, Spain can once again become an important European power," says this author, who notes that "A vital problem for Spain lies in the extent to which the existing regime can continue dictatorial procedures to the contradiction of popular sentiment."

Spain Looks to the Future

BY RHEA MARSH SMITH

Professor of History, Rollins College

THE REPORTS that have flooded the United States about Spain present a very misleading picture of actual conditions. On the one hand, the propaganda agencies of the Spanish government attempt to present a view in which everything is either black or white. Perhaps this is one of the reasons for the negative reaction of many Americans to Spanish propaganda. It became customary during the Spanish Civil War for the Nationalists to apply the term "Red" to all members of the opposing forces. Such an epithet ignored the varying psychologies of the parties struggling against the Franco government when, in fact, they included Catholics, Republicans, Socialists, Anarchists, Basques, Catalans, Valencians and Galicians. To apply a single, all-inclusive term not only reacted unfavorably on American public opinion, which recognized its propagandist intent, but also confused the real issues.

On the other hand, the exiled opposition to Franco and many commentators on Spain have been guilty of the same error of gen-

eralization. They have emphasized the dictatorial aspects of the present Spanish regime without explaining adequately their causes and their objectives. Many writers, guilty of the same tendency to generalize, were subject to partisan political prejudice or approached the Spanish problem with a thesis already formulated. They have often tried to describe a very complicated situation in a glib phrase.

In reality, each nation has to solve its contemporary problems in its own way. Each nation has evolved along a different historical path, conditioned by its own peculiar geographical, political, social, economic and religious problems. To attempt to solve its problems by following a doctrinaire or alien theory or to imitate the precedents established by another nation would ignore tradition and complicate its problems without solving them.

In any evaluation of Spain it is imperative to recognize the forces of decentralization within the peninsula. Spain, as a superficially united kingdom, was created by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabel. This personal union joined regions of diverse and often opposed traditions and objectives. From the beginning, the central and largest area of Castile, the true motherland of American empire, tried and superficially succeeded in assuming the dominant leadership of the nation.

While this trend was accentuated under the rulers of the Hapsburg and Bourbon dynasties, the particularism of the component natural and traditional regions within the Spanish nation was never eradicated.

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It provoked anarchy in the era of the Constitution of 1812, wrecked the efforts of the First Republic in 1873, was recognized in autonomous statutes granted to Catalonia and the Basque Provinces under the Second Republic and, despite the efforts to intensify the Castilianization of Spain under Franco, still offers an insuperable obstacle to national unity and regional cooperation.

Regional dialects and languages persist in Catalonia, the Basque Provinces and Galicia. Andalusia, the most productive agricultural area conquered by the Castilians from the Moslems, has its own regional characteristics, even though its people may feel more Castilian than the Castilians themselves.

The fact remains that Castile, with its capital at Madrid, is the most unproductive region in the nation. The central meseta clings like a mighty octopus to the illusion of national unity and lives parasitically on the industry of the more fertile and productive regions lying around its perimeter: in Galicia to the northwest, the Cantabrian coast and the Basque Provinces to the north, Catalonia to the northeast and Valencia to the east. However much the government of Spain may try to Castilianize these regions, their resistance is still strong. With a strong government they may submit and cooperate. With a weak government they will surely reassert their traditional particularisms, an obstacle to the real unity of the Spanish people.

II

In attempting an evaluation of the current Spanish scene, it is important to recognize certain other factors that are vital to its analysis. In the first place, it is impossible to generalize about Spain.

There are areas of Spain which are rock strewn and totally uncultivable. Yet, while on the Upper Meseta, in Old Castile, the land lies fallow, in similar areas, just as mountainous, in Granada, the stones have been industriously piled in heaps in the center of the fields and the land carefully tilled around them. There are areas, as in the Aragonese desert, between Zaragoza and Barcelona, where the land is nearly uncultivable because even irrigation is pre-

cluded by the distance from the rivers and the salt water which lies beneath the soil. Even here, however, fields of forage crops are found, an indication of the tenacious industry of the Spanish farmer.

In short, Spain presents such a variety geographically that it escapes generalization. It is obviously inaccurate to attempt to describe an area in general terms or on superficial observation during one of the changing seasons.

The same inaccuracy of generalization applies to the Spanish people. The Spaniard, by tradition and through historical experience, has evolved into a thorough individualist, proud, self-reliant, independent in thought and tenacious of his political opinions. Every Spaniard is a solitary and unique political party in his own right.

It is difficult, even when driven by economic misery, for a Spaniard to subscribe to the doctrines of communism. In fact, if anarchism were enlightened and not savagely ignorant of the rights of others, it would be a simple solution for the political ills of the country for each Spaniard to be an anarchist. That such a Utopia cannot exist does not prevent every Spaniard from regarding the intervention of the government in his private affairs as an intrusion; his individualism leads him to evade its action as much as possible. The acceptance of governmental decrees, unless they are of profit to the Spaniards themselves, is both reluctant and subject to procrastination. To the Spaniard, the government is best which restricts his activities the least and gives him the greatest opportunity to pursue his individual objectives.

Another factor in Spanish psychology, which also defies regulation, is the strength of family solidarity and friendship. Legislation may be enacted, attempts may even be made to enforce it, but it is ineffective if the individual affected has a relative in an official position or is acquainted with a man in authority. Evasion is no longer necessary, as in the case of the Spaniard who merely absented himself from his office on the day the collector appeared, to avoid paying his income tax. The collector promised to return the following year. Friendship with an official or access to him

often permits the individual to escape with impunity from the effects of legislation which is equally obnoxious to others.

In many respects, the Spaniard is a law unto himself and has little respect for the law imposed upon him from without. If he were as self-disciplined as he is proud and self-reliant, the problem of government would be easy, but he reacts to the attempt to force authority upon him with vigor and often with violence.

Such traits in the character of the Spaniard lead inevitably to the conclusion that the only successful government in Spain must be a strong one. The individualism of the Spaniard and his disregard for law cannot be controlled by any weak authority. The failure of the efforts to establish a republic in Spain may be in part attributed to this necessity as well as to the fact that the people have neither historical precedents nor experience for a republican form of government.

The Second Republic failed because it was not strong enough. A liberal democracy is so preoccupied with the necessity of being liberal and democratic that it may often be unable to direct and lead the people who created it. If, in addition, the people possess a strong tendency toward assertive individualism, the result is disastrous.

III

Spain is at present a monarchy without a king. Generalissimo Franco, as Chief of State and head of the Council of Regency, is the executive leader of the government for the designated king, Don Carlos, son of Don Juan and grandson of Alfonso XIII. As a reaction to the anarchy which prevailed under the Second Republic and the threat of communism, the majority of the Spaniards would accept a monarchy. By tradition and for sentimental reasons, it would appear to be the type of government best adapted to Spain.

The Spaniards have had little practical experience to prepare them for the conduct of a stable republican government, although they have strong traditions of local democracy. They demand spectacular display in their executive chiefs, to which they were long accustomed under the Hapsburgs and

the Bourbons. The Generalissimo gives them that display with his ceremonial and his Moorish Guard.

Francisco Franco is a Galician, both reserved and clever. He became heir to the leadership of the Nationalist forces by the common consent of the other generals when two of his seniors, Generals Sanjurjo and Mola, were killed in aeroplane crashes. He provides the strong control necessary to restrain Spanish anarchist tendencies. The Generalissimo seldom appears at social functions and devotes himself to a simple private life. There is little indication that he has sought power for himself for other than patriotic motives. Above all, Franco has given the Spaniards peace following a destructive civil war and for that they are grateful.

While the Spaniards are happy with peace, they are not unanimously happy with Franco. The core of his support lies in Castile and especially in Madrid. The capital, as the administrative center of the kingdom, is largely composed of civil employees and persons whose livelihood depends in large measure on the success of the Franco regime.

As one approaches the perimeter of the peninsula, in the Basque Provinces and Catalonia, where regional feeling is still strong, there is little affection for Franco. The indications are that Galicia, Franco's native land (he was born at El Ferrol del Caudillo), supports the Franco regime strongly, despite a strong regional tradition. Valencia, on the other hand, which has little regional feeling, but which has always been strongly republican, has little attachment for him.

In these regions, where regional languages have been suppressed in the interest of Castilian, jokes are frequently made at the expense of Franco. Yet there is little evidence that more overt opposition is imminent. The people want neither war nor revolution. They are able to instruct the rising generation in their cherished tongues in the privacy of their homes and so perpetuate the regional traditions. The strong hand of the central government also provides a restraining and stabilizing influence. There are four principal bulwarks of the

Franco regime. The strongest of these is the army. The Nationalist movement began as another of the *pronunciamientos*, through which the military leaders patriotically hoped to restore order. They were traditional in sentiment and did not adequately comprehend the anarchic distaste of the Spaniards for restraint or the popular nature of the parties supporting the Second Republic.

They expected the movement to restore order in a matter of days. When they found themselves confronted by a civilian populace that resisted nearly without arms and took vindictive revenge on their former masters, the Civil War entered a more savage phase. Russian technicians and commissars had penetrated the forces loyal to the Second Republic and seized positions of command. The Nationalists then called in Nazi and Fascist reinforcements to redress the balance of power, and the civil war was prolonged for four years.

Franco has come increasingly to rely on the army as his principal support. Spanish military men, even though sadly underpaid by American standards, so that officers often have to assume other jobs to support themselves, are extremely loyal to their leaders. They are in turn loyal to the strong state. Many of the principal advisers of the regime are generals.

A second source of support is found in the Church. Franco, as a loyal and mystical Catholic, has always depended on the Church as an ally. Spain is traditionally a Catholic country. The Republic made the mistake of persecuting the Church, guided by anti-clerical sentiment; thereby it alienated a strong sector of public opinion. The Catholic Action party appeared and the defense of clerical interests was immediately undertaken.

Franco has restored the Church to an official position and cemented the alliance of Church and State. The religious orders were readmitted and the clergy again became arbiters of political influence. The clergy opposed the Nationalist movement only in the Basque Provinces and in Catalonia, where even the members of the clergy were more regional than Catholic in sentiment (although their religious fervor was un-

diminished). Now the Church has regained its privileged position in Spain and again wields strong political influence.

One of the strongest evidences of increased clerical influence is the evolution of the former secret society of *Opus Dei* from the Catholic Action party. Now recognized by the Vatican, this organization has as its principal objective the extension of Catholic control through a lay organization like the Knights of Columbus.

Spanish liberals resent its intervention in political affairs. It is charged that it seeks ever greater influence to monopolize positions of civil authority. It is further charged that appointments to professorial positions are now completely under its control, that persons of ability often fail to obtain appointments in competition with less able candidates who are members of *Opus Dei*.

The Spanish Falanx is a third ally of the Franco regime. As the sole recognized political party, with a secretary in a position of authority, it also has important cultural influence. Its leaders have tried to renovate the nation. As the heir of the Directory of his father, Miguel Primo de Rivera, the founder of the Falanx, Jose Primo de Rivera has been immortalized. His sister, Pilar, has important influence as one of the leaders of social reform in the nation. The feminine section of the Falanx intervenes in educational procedures, stimulates the preservation of cultural traditions and probably has a more important national influence than the masculine membership.

The truth of the matter is that the Falanx, even as the sole political party, does not wield the political influence it once commanded. In seeking to restore Spain as a nation, the founders modelled their movement after the National Socialist party in Germany and the Fascist party in Italy. During Spain's alliance with the Axis Powers during the Civil War and the early part of the Second World War, the Falanx exercised a preponderant influence. When Franco saw that the Allied armies were increasingly victorious and that the danger of the German threat across the Pyrenees was less imminent, the influence of the Falanx decreased. It was more important for Spain to reestablish amicable relations with the

Western democracies than to advance the interests of the only Spanish political party. Internally the Phalanx has been responsible for many economic and social measures which have been of value in reconstructing the nation after a disastrous civil war.

A fourth group strongly supporting the present regime in Spain consists of the monarchists who see in it a transition to the restoration of the Bourbons. Although as a class they do not collectively exercise the dominant political influence they once enjoyed, many aristocrats have individually and very ably contributed to the economic and social reconstruction of the nation. The principal obstacle to the restoration of the monarchy lies in the fact that a whole generation has been born and matured in a period in which Spain had no king. It may be difficult to convince the younger Spaniards of the advantages of a monarchy.

Even to a casual observer, it is evident that Spain is undergoing a social revolution. Civil war in Spain became inevitable when political, social, economic and religious issues so sharply divided the nation that the liberal and doctrinaire theorists who led the Republican and Socialist forces were no longer able to prevent the division of Spain into the two extremes of reaction and too rapid reform. Economic and social reforms are now restricting the political influence of the aristocracy as a class. The new middle class is rapidly extending its wealth and political influence. Charges of graft and corruption are levelled against the *nouveaux riches*, but there is no evidence that Franco himself is responsible for the peculation of those who profit from the new regime. The new middle class is especially important in Madrid.

The lower classes are immediately no better off than they were under the Second Republic. Prices have risen more rapidly than wages. Housing cannot keep pace with the demands of the growing population. On the other hand, there is abundant evidence that the Spanish Government is seeking to attract the support of the lower classes by careful attention to the improvement of their condition. A great deal of public and private capital has been devoted to housing and the construction of sanatoria and even

to technical training in specialized skills for the lower classes.

Nevertheless, reform by political action is a slow process when confronted by tradition and a certain amount of inertia. One of the vital problems in Spain is whether the lower classes can be restrained from a violent reaction to their condition until reforms can be made effective. In large measures, the answer to this problem depends on the continuation of a strong national government, capable of maintaining order and restraining anarchy and violence.

In short, the political problem of Spain centers on Franco. Spaniards are universally concerned about his successor. Because of the inability of man to predict mortality, a choice of a successor who will be able to continue the policies of Franco cannot be made. It remains to be seen whether the generals and the politicians in the Council of Regency will patriotically and selflessly suppress their private ambition and co-operate for the welfare of a strong Spain or indulge their vanity in a disastrous struggle for the succession.

There are many evidences that there is no longer unanimity even among the groups supporting the Generalissimo. The Phalanx resents the influence of the army. The clergy would like to extend their political influence until it becomes paramount in Spain and they are making every effort to accomplish their objective. It is evident that thinking Spaniards are looking to the future with some degree of alarm. The problem is vital. Will a strong leader succeed Franco or will the nation revert to anarchy and chaos?

The Spaniard has an intense devotion to his traditions of individual liberty. The unnecessary restriction of them during the Directory of Miguel Primo de Rivera was an important factor which led to the establishment of the Second Republic. Contemporary Spaniards feel keenly the heavy hand of dictatorship, the censorship, the restrictions on their ideological freedom and the use of secret police, and they individually defy them. A vital problem for Spain lies in the extent to which the existing regime can continue dictatorial procedures to the contradiction of popular sentiment. That, too, may contribute to anarchy.

IV

Economically, Spain has long been in a serious predicament. After a disastrous civil war the situation became more critical, although the present regime has done much in the reconstruction of the nation. Nevertheless, Spain is continually in desperate need of two important commodities: water and capital. The provision of an adequate water supply to irrigate the central meseta is dependent partially on divine providence, which has never consistently provided an abundance of rainfall. The more certain supply of water by irrigation demands capital.

Spanish capital was devoted to civil war and royal pleasure during the nineteenth century when other nations were developing their industrial power. Some foreign capital was attracted from Great Britain, France and Germany, but it proved to be of little value to the nation because it was used to exploit national resources. The present government has restricted exploitation of this nature, but such action does not attract foreign capital seeking a profitable return. The Spaniards are increasingly devoting both their private and public means to the development of their resources, but these are insufficient to meet the demands of hydroelectric power, irrigation and mechanical agriculture.

Judged by American standards, Spanish methods of agriculture and highway construction are exceedingly primitive. Oxen are used in plowing. Grain is harvested with a scythe or sickle. Roads are laboriously built by hand. The rocks are broken by hand, hand carts pushed along rails dump the stones in place. The problem is, however, an economic one. The use of modern agricultural or grading equipment would put many people out of work. With an abundance of manpower it is more economical to follow traditional methods than it is to save time and labor through the use of modern machinery.

In reality, Spain is a very poor country. For a century it has suffered from an unfavorable balance of trade which has drained the nation of capital instead of contributing to its accumulation. The Spanish standard

of living cannot be compared with that of the United States or any highly industrialized nation with abundant resources.

Poverty is a natural result of the Spanish predicament. Not only Gypsies but many Spaniards live in caves which are only too plainly visible from the highways. The poorest sections of Spain are found in various centers of the meseta, where rainfall is uncertain, and drought and a low standard of living are inevitable. With the rise of prices which has been more rapid than that of wages, there is extensive poverty even in Madrid. The wealth is unequally distributed and the balance is not being corrected. Spain, however, is not unique in that respect. Poverty as extreme as that witnessed in the slums of Madrid is to be found in many parts of the United States. The difference is that it is not universal in the United States.

The Spaniards themselves are making efforts to improve the lot of the lower classes. Public housing improvements have been extensive. The principal difficulty has been that many of the more affluent members of the middle class have taken as summer residences housing originally intended for the homeless. In Andaluzia, especially, once the land of the great *latifundia* of absentee landlords, colonization projects are under way. Near Madrid, in the Guadarramas, sanatoria for the workers are being built. Technical institutes have been opened for the training of workers in more specialized skills. It will take time, however, for the fruition of these developments and for their effects to become evident in the national economy.

Except for the highly industrialized areas around Bilbao and Barcelona, Spain is an agricultural country. In a good year, the central meseta produces wheat and has extensive vineyards. Valencia raises oranges and vegetables. Granada has extensive olive groves, which were devastated by frost in 1954. Wine and vegetables are important commodities in Andaluzia. Despite the probable dislocation of manpower, Spain is trying to mechanize her agriculture, conserve her hydroelectric power with dams and extend irrigation. At the present time, however, Spain has to import foodstuffs.

V

In exchange for the use of naval and air bases, manned by a minimum of American personnel, the United States, in 1953, agreed to provide Spain with a limited amount of economic and military aid. The Spaniards regard this as a mutually beneficial program. Their reconstruction after the Civil War was conducted without external assistance and they are proud of their independent accomplishments. The United States is regarded as an equal partner in this alliance. The bargain is also an advantageous one for the United States. For a small outlay of economic and military aid, less than the Spaniards would like, the United States has obtained a staunch ally in the event of war with the Communists and bases from which to launch the reinvasion of Europe should that continent be overrun to the Pyrenees.

There is more than military expediency in the alliance. While Spain holds a most strategic position on both the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, offering bases in the former and access to Europe from the latter, she also forms an area of transition between Europe and Africa. Her fighting men on both sides in the Civil War proved that they were tough, self-reliant and resourceful, even when poorly equipped. While the Spaniards presently are friendly toward the Americans, they do not appear to have as much affection for the British and the French. It would be a mistake, however, for the United States to pour more than the minimum of military manpower proposed into the peninsula. Such a move would undoubtedly arouse much resentment.

One of the difficulties in the defense of Spain is the condition of the Spanish system of highway communication. The principal roads were paved during the Directory of Primo de Rivera, but they are narrow, and worn with age and the connecting roads are not good. With American aid, the Spaniards are improving their highways, regrading, resurfacing and straightening them. On the other hand, the mountainous terrain of Spain offers successive lines of defense and Spain would be difficult for a modern army to invade against the valiant defense that can be expected.

Spain lies within air range of the Communist-dominated heartland of Europe. The only means of defending her against air attack is to improve and man her air bases, so that the Western democracies would have air superiority there in the event of war. Then, with Spain adequately defended, the United States would possess a secure base for air attacks on Communist centers.

One important problem arises in relation to American aid to Spain which requires delicate diplomacy. The Franco regime with which the American alliance was concluded happens at present to be dominant in Spain. On the other hand, there are other Spanish factions which might easily be offended if they concluded that the principal bulwark of the Franco regime was American aid. In the event of the subversion of the present government or the outbreak of civil war or the death of Franco, the friendship of these opposition groups would be extremely important. It is essential, therefore, to follow a cautious policy. The United States should try not to alienate any Spaniard, but should insist rather that American aid be used for the general welfare of the nation, instead of for the profit of any one faction.

The military services of the United States, which have long advocated the alliance with Spain, should not be handicapped in their program by political interference for any American profit. Thus far, the alliance is between Spain and the United States. It is of mutual benefit and should be kept on an impersonal basis.

VI

There is one significant danger in the economic and military reconstruction of Spain. Once restored as an important power, there is a danger in Spanish pride and memories of her glorious past. The Spaniard may again become an imperialist and attempt to extend his influence through national egoism to the detriment of his neighbors. Some Portuguese are already concerned lest a powerful Spain try to reunite the entire peninsula. Some Spaniards speak of Portugal as a province of Spain, recalling the era of Philip II when the peninsula was under one ruler. The Portuguese overseas possessions are tempting as a safety valve for

surplus populations and a provider of greater resources.

Officially the Spaniards appear to be united on their desire to recover Gibraltar, claiming that their allies defrauded them when the British occupied the "Rock" in 1704. This attitude has been officially inspired in student demonstrations and is stronger in Castile than it is in the perimeter of the peninsula. In part, it provides a slogan designed to unite the Spaniards against an ancient enemy. Although government-inspired agitation may continue, there is little danger that Franco will risk an open break with the British. While at present the British are not so popular as they once were in Castile, they still hold extensive investments in Spain and the Spaniards need British markets for their agricultural exports.

In the Civil War, the Nationalists recalled the Moors to redress the balance of power in Spain. Since the conclusion of the war, Franco has followed a policy of conciliation toward the Moslems of North Africa to extend Spanish influence in a period when Spain had no European allies and to subvert and attract the Moslem populations in the French colonies in North Africa.

The French have openly accused the Spaniards of assisting the Moslem Nationalists, but, as the Spaniards reply, Spain has followed a more successful colonial policy in North Africa than France. There is a great deal of Moorish blood in Spain and the peninsula is as African as it is European. Granting independence to Spanish Morocco could attract the Arab nations to an even stronger alliance with the Western democracies. It might also be used imperialistically in an attempt to recover ancient Spanish holdings in North Africa and to expand them. Friction in North Africa also produces difficulties between two of the allies of the United States.

During the Second World War, Spain was a non-belligerent ally of the Axis powers, partly to repay them for their aid to the Nationalists in the Civil War, partly to prevent a German invasion of the peninsula which might have imperilled the Allied occupation of North Africa. Whatever the policy, whatever the motives that inspired it,

there is still a close tie between the Spaniards and the Germans. The latter are travelling in Spain in ever-increasing numbers as tourists and business men. With their industry and efficiency, the Germans are also increasing their commerce with Spain.

The Spaniards recall that at the height of their imperial greatness under Charles V, they shared a common ruler with the Germans. This sentimental attachment between the Germans and the Spaniards will undoubtedly increase as Germany reemerges as a dominant power in Western Europe. On the one hand, it strengthens the Western alliance, but it also poses a problem for the other nations of Western Europe, especially for France, which lies between Germany and Spain, and for Great Britain, whose European commerce is now being undermined by a resurgent Western Germany.

While the tendency of the Spaniards is to dwell on the past, there is little doubt that by careful planning, Spain can once again become an important European power. She has linguistic and sentimental ties with half the New World. The Spaniards are an industrious, virile and energetic people. They have the potential qualities which may again enable them to play a role in world affairs. From a position of isolation in 1947, when Spain was condemned by the United Nations, she has already been restored to the world family of nations, an ally of the United States and a member of the United Nations.

It is to be hoped that in their continued reconstruction the Spaniards will build wisely so that they retain the unity of their diverse regions. They must also guard against the temptation of imperialism. Franco, a Galician, as Chief of State, is the successor of two dynasties of foreign rulers. In a sense, he is the first Spaniard to dictate the destinies of Spain since the era of Ferdinand and Isabel. The symbols of the new regime are the same as those of the Catholic kings, the yoke and the arrows of the personal union. If Franco demonstrates his wisdom in internal policies, if he does not divert Spanish energy in foreign adventures and if chaos does not follow his demise, Spain may well have a future as well as a glorious past.

In Scandinavia, "there is good reason for surmising that the commitments inherent in NATO membership will not be indefinitely continued, that neutralism will gain ground—unless the international situation markedly worsens"

Neutralism in Scandinavia

BY JOHN H. WUORINEN

Chairman of the Department of History, Columbia University

WHEN the war ended in 1945, it was taken for granted that the world of blood and iron that had emerged after the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 had at long last come to an end. Such expectations were soon shown to be unrealistic, however. [By February, 1948, when Czechoslovakia fell victim to a Communist coup, it had become clear that Soviet aggression was assuming dimensions that seriously threatened the democratic West, and that defense measures against the threat were in order.]

The first important defense measure was the Brussels Pact of March 17, 1948. Signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Britain it provided among other things that each signatory would come to the aid of any member threatened by armed attack. A new "Western Union" thus came into being. The base of the new alliance was broadened and the alliance itself was expanded on April 4, 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty Pact was signed by the United States, Canada, Italy, Portugal, Iceland, Norway, Denmark and

the states of the Brussels agreement. Greece and Turkey were added to the new twelve-power peacetime alliance in February, 1952, and West Germany joined in December, 1954.

It has been frequently remarked that American participation in NATO represents a unique deviation from traditional policy. This was caused by an unprecedented European situation, created by Soviet aggression of such potential magnitude as to lead to the conclusion that for the United States to remain self-contained and neutralist would mean greater risks than those involved in making advance commitments to European states. These commitments would serve, if war came, as the West's first line of defense.

The same can be said, with some obvious modifications, about the Scandinavian states. There also the situation that led to NATO brought forth new problems and compulsions. [There is not the slightest doubt but that the Scandinavian states, if left free to consult their traditional interests, inclinations and preferences, would have chosen to remain wholly outside Big Power contests.] Under "normal" conditions they would have clung to their pre-1939 policy of peace, neutrality and friendship toward all nations. But conditions after 1945 were not normal, and the result was that western Scandinavia (Norway, Denmark, and Iceland) joined NATO in 1949 while eastern Scandinavia (Sweden and Finland) did not.]

Decisive among the circumstances that

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determined the verdict for or against NATO in 1949 was the experience of these nations before 1939 and during World War II.

When World War I began, Sweden had not been involved in war for some three generations and Denmark for about 40 years. Norway had been fully sovereign for less than a decade and therefore had no long-range independent foreign policy. Finland was to emerge as an independent Republic only in 1917-1918. Iceland, formerly a possession of Denmark, had obtained home rule in 1904, became sovereign under the Danish Crown in 1918 and was established as a Republic as late as 1944.

These differing backgrounds and the historical experiences connected with them before 1914 did not mean any marked difference in the main foreign policy objectives between 1919 and 1939. These states joined and supported the League of Nations in which they saw, for several years, a prospect of mutual protection and the enforcement of law in a hitherto lawless world. When the League in the 1930's showed itself to be ineffective in the face of Japanese and especially Italian aggression, their attitude changed. The emergence of the Hitlerite menace speeded the transformation.

The result was a drawing away from the League and an attempt to set up a Scandinavian defensive alliance. Finland was most receptive to the idea, while Denmark and Norway shied away from it with ostentatious insistence that a Northern defense alliance would offer no security and would merely create a new danger zone. Ultimately, a policy of complete neutrality was followed. This meant no taking of sides in any Big Power conflict, friendship with all and no aggressive designs against any nation.

By the summer of 1939, the Scandinavian neutrality front had emerged clearly defined. When the war began, the Northern nations issued virtually identical neutrality declarations, firmly resolved not to become embroiled in the conflict. Ultimately, however, only Sweden succeeded in keeping out of the war.

It is not difficult to understand that the varying experiences of the nations of the North during the war decided in large

measure the choice for or against NATO in 1949.

FINLAND

Finland had been defeated in the war and, despite heroic and remarkably successful resistance to Soviet invasion, had to accept a most onerous peace. To be sure, the independence of the nation and its democratic institutions had been saved. The Russian-dictated peace, however, left the Republic for several years in a precarious position which required extreme caution and skill in the planning and execution of policy. By 1953, the situation had greatly improved. Domestic communism serving the interests of Moscow had been fought to a standstill, and the huge war reparations payments had been completed by 1952.

Meanwhile, Finland's foreign relations position remained exposed for several years. During the years 1945-1949, the hostility of the Soviets to a Finnish foreign policy dictated by Finland's own preferences and interests was frequently disclosed. In 1948, for example, when the formation of a Northern neutrality bloc was considered in Finland and the other Scandinavian countries, Moscow chose to see in the plan merely a potential anti-Soviet military coalition serving the interests of the West. Its opposition sufficed to prevent Finland from participating in the discussions. In April, 1948, Finland felt obliged to accept a mutual assistance treaty with the U.S.S.R.

Under the circumstances Finland's membership in NATO was of course out of the question. The determination of Helsinki was not to pursue any foreign policy that might arouse Soviet suspicions or enmity. Another factor was, however, also involved. The Western architects of NATO and other measures for containing the Soviets in 1949 never indicated that Finland had been included within the area that the U.S.S.R. could touch only at its own peril. The Finns saw in this circumstance a decision that left them without support from the West in their grim and silent, and ultimately amazingly successful contest for the preservation of their democratic institutions and national independence.

SWEDEN

Sweden's success in remaining outside the war has been frequently explained as resulting from a deliberate peace policy that has been meticulously followed for well over a century. Such explanations are inadequate. They do not distinguish between policy on the one hand and circumstances outside Sweden's control on the other; they imply that mere determination to remain neutral is all that really matters and that nations that fall victim to aggression must have been in some degree deficient in their resolve or clumsy in their efforts to avoid war. In any case, they do not suffice to clarify the whys and wherefores of Sweden's decision not to join NATO.

The decision rested on several considerations. Taken together, they spelled a conclusion that was most succinctly stated in April, 1948, by the then Premier Tage Erlander when he said that Sweden's policy was the simple one of defending, by means of "armed neutrality," her national independence, and that alliances and commitments that would make the nation a pawn in the international Big Power struggle for power must be resolutely avoided. Alliances—NATO included—must be shunned because they mean the risk of becoming involved in conflicts which, without alliances, can be or may be avoided. Although differences of opinion have emerged in recent years regarding the wisdom or adequacy of this policy of neutrality, it has remained basically unchanged since 1948.

This is, to be sure, not the whole story. The choice has not merely been between "armed neutrality" that leaves Sweden standing alone, and membership in an armed NATO headed by the United States and Great Britain. At various times since the early part of the last war, Sweden has had a hand in attempts to form a Scandinavian defense union, meaning thereby an armed coalition dedicated to keeping the North outside Big Power contests and strong enough to deter aggression.

Finland, Sweden and Norway gave thought to an armed alliance in the spring of 1940 but the idea was abandoned because of Soviet opposition to it. Sweden

and Finland considered a two-nation arrangement in the autumn of the same year. The Soviet chose to see in the contemplated alliance an anti-Soviet combination in-the-making and it was not carried through. In 1948, Sweden pressed for a three-power Northern coalition (Sweden, Norway and Denmark, Finland not being able to participate because of her precarious position at the time). She hoped for a genuine defense alliance that could be considered a satisfactory substitute for NATO, which was then being recommended to the Scandinavian states.

The effort failed. Norway and Denmark joined NATO, and the chance for serious, extensive military cooperation between the three states vanished.

NORWAY

Prior to the German invasion in April, 1940, Norway had embraced neutrality no less unreservedly than her neighbors. The five years of war-time German occupation meant experiences that brought the conviction that the traditional policy of neutrality no longer sufficed. It seemed clear that links binding Norway to the nations of the West must be forged. This led ultimately to a fundamental change of foreign policy.

The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the signing of the Brussels Treaty and other indications of the increasing urgency of the security problem of the West appeared to mean, among other things, that the peace guarantees offered by the United Nations were neither trustworthy nor adequate. The alternatives seemed to be either to join the Atlantic treaty then under consideration or to become a member of a Scandinavian regional alliance proposed especially by Sweden.

The latter alternative was ultimately rejected. The reason was Sweden's insistence that the proposed alliance be rigidly exclusive, with no dependence on outside power combinations, while the Norwegian view was that an advance promise of military assistance from the Western Powers was indispensable. The two alternatives, which had been originally thought of as com-

plementary, thus became competitive and Norway's ultimate choice was NATO.

DENMARK

In Denmark, pretty much the same considerations and line of development are to be noted. There also the growing urgency of the security problem—accented by extensive political strikes during the winter of 1947-1948 and other evidences of the Communist menace—came to be sensed in a way that led first to a consideration of a Scandinavian defensive alliance as the way out, and ultimately to the conclusion that Denmark should join the Atlantic group.

Three general aspects of the Danish attitude and choice deserve passing comment. The first is that the main responsibility for joining NATO was assumed by the Socialists (they were in power, under Premier Hedtoft, from 1947 to 1950). This circumstance is especially noteworthy because the Socialists had been the most insistent and active supporters, in the 1930's, of a program calling for the complete demilitarization of the nation. Before the war, they had also most strenuously opposed any and every kind of Scandinavian mutual defense arrangement, to say nothing of military commitments involving the major Powers.

Secondly, in deciding in favor of NATO, considerable emphasis was placed on the view that the Atlantic Pact is, as Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen put it in 1949, "a cornerstone of the strengthening of the United Nations." The Pact was not, it was held, incompatible with the Charter; it was a regional or collective defense arrangement definitely envisaged in the Charter. The supporters of the Pact also contended that to accept it was, in view of the impotence of the United Nations, the only way to safeguard the security of Denmark.

Thirdly, judging by parliamentary and other discussion, the decision to join and rely on NATO implied no abandonment of the idea that the United Nations has, and will continue to have, an important mediating function. This line of thought has not sufficed, however, to obscure the fact that NATO and the United Nations have not, in the Danish view, meant identical policies

or objectives. The main member of NATO, the United States, has not been inclined, in critical situations, to rely on the mediating function of the United Nations. On the contrary, the United States has made use of the United Nations in the power struggle with the Communist bloc. How to pursue an independent policy dictated by purely Danish considerations has turned out to be one of the baffling questions to which Danish ingenuity has not yet furnished a satisfactory answer.

ICELAND

Iceland stands in a category by itself. Geographically and strategically Iceland represents a security factor and problem in American planning that is quite different from that represented, say, by Denmark. It is perhaps no accident that Iceland has come to stand of late as the segment of the NATO front that will in all likelihood require a change in the arrangements of the past several years.

Iceland became independent, though still in union with the Danish Crown, in 1918. During the last war, the country was occupied by the British in 1940 after the German invasion of Denmark. The Republic of Iceland was formally established on June 17, 1944. The next year, at the end of the war, foreign troops were withdrawn. The population of the tiny Republic is at present approximately 150,000. The Republic maintains no armed forces of its own. When Iceland joined NATO in 1949 it was agreed that foreign armed forces would be stationed in the country only in time of war and only with the country's permission.

In 1951, however, when the international situation appeared to have deteriorated in a manner that meant an "imminent danger to Iceland and the allies of Iceland," the United States and Iceland signed an agreement permitting the stationing of American troops in Iceland. Some 4,000 United States troops have therefore been in the country for the past five years, manning the Keflavik air base and radar and other defense installations.

Under the 1951 agreements, its provisions can be rendered null and void 18 months

after Iceland has served notice of intention to cancel them and to return to the status that obtained before foreign troops had been allowed to enter.

The Icelandic legislature adopted a resolution in March, 1956, calling for the departure of the United States forces. In June, Iceland requested the Council of NATO to review the necessity of continuing the defense facilities in Iceland, and to "make recommendations" to the two governments concerning the continuation of the 1951 defense agreement. The Council issued its statement on July 26. It held that the world situation was basically no less precarious than it had been in 1951, that the Western Powers could not and should not relax their vigilance, that defense forces and installations are still required in Iceland, and it "earnestly" recommended that the 1951 agreement between the United States and Iceland "be continued in such form and with such practical arrangements as will maintain the strength of the common defense."

The Council's recommendation is not binding upon Iceland. The indications are, at the time of writing, that Iceland intends to free the nation from foreign military forces.

The reasons for Iceland's action are not far to seek. They are solidly anchored in internal, national considerations; Communist or other political objectives appear to be peripheral. The Icelanders have come to feel that important aspects of their national existence are threatened by the pro-

longed presence of foreign troops in the country.

A large part of the nation's economy has become dependent on income from the American-controlled military base. This means a questionable and unreliable foundation on which to build, especially in view of the fact that the large American expenditures since 1951 have produced an ominous inflationary trend.

It is also feared that the proud and ancient culture of the nation is being corroded and changed by the presence of a relatively large group of foreigners. It is believed that the existence and independence of Iceland depend on maintaining intact and sharply defined the cultural and linguistic separateness which is the foundation of the nation itself and which therefore must be jealously and effectively guarded.

Norway and Denmark do not contend with the kind of problems and situations noted in the case of Iceland. Still in these countries, also, internal, national considerations are emerging that appear to be destined, in time, to challenge and to modify the analyses and conclusions that led to the original acceptance of membership in NATO. There is good reason for surmising that the commitments inherent in NATO membership will not be indefinitely continued, that neutralism will gain ground—unless the international situation markedly worsens—and that some form of regional Scandinavian defense arrangement will probably emerge as a congenial substitute for such aspects of NATO as the passage of time will modify or eliminate.

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Franklin D. Roosevelt, Four Freedoms Speech, January 6, 1941.

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Italy: Opening to the Left?

BY CHARLES F. DELZELL

Associate Professor of History, Vanderbilt University

ITALY emerged from World War II battle-scarred, bankrupt, and stripped of her overseas colonies. Her people were rent by conflicting emotions. A minority, led by anti-Fascists fresh from the Resistance, hoped to create a new order of society and government. Another minority of extreme Rightists, embittered by the war-time debacle, Trieste's uncertain fate, "de-Fascistization," and later the repudiation of the monarchy, nostalgically yearned for the good old days. In between stood the mass of ordinary people, exhausted and bewildered, but willing to embark upon what to all but the older generation was a new political experience.

Italy's first post-war governments were confronted with huge tasks—some new, but many long-standing. Consideration of most of the "old" problems—like overpopulation, limited natural resources, and southern backwardness—was simply postponed while priority was given to the immediate ones of reconstructing the State apparatus; deciding the fate of the monarchy, tarnished by its 20-year toleration of Fascism; and, once the Republic was agreed upon, preparation of a

new Constitution and healing of sectional grievances.

As these and other questions raised political tempers, and as the world drifted into the Cold War, the substantial unity that had been forged during the Resistance came to an end. The Communists and Left-wing Socialists, who at first had collaborated in the government, turned against it; and when the Rightist parties regrouped, the government faced attacks from them as well. Meanwhile, people had to be provided with emergency relief, with the aid of UNRRA and direct assistance from the United States. Transportation, industry and agriculture all had to be revitalized. Before Italy could call her soul her own, the peace treaty had to be signed; even after that, the fate of Trieste and the colonies remained unsettled.

By 1947, Italy had to decide whether to side with the West or seek to maintain precarious neutrality in the world ideological struggle. Under the leadership of the late Premier Alcide DeGasperi and Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza, she threw in her lot with the West, accepted Marshall aid, joined NATO, and advocated European integration.¹

When Signor DeGasperi assumed the premiership in December, 1945, upon the fall of Ferruccio Parri—the austere, idealistic head of the democratic wing of the Resistance—it was the first time in modern Italian history that a practicing Roman

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¹Excellent, up-to-date analyses of post-war political and socio-economic trends may be found in Muriel Grindrod, *The Rebuilding of Italy: Politics and Economics, 1945-1955* (London, 1955); H. Stuart Hughes, *The United States and Italy* (Cambridge, 1953); and the essays of Leo Valiani and others in *Dieci anni dopo, 1945-1955* (Bari, 1955).

Catholic headed the government. Many feared that the nation had fallen into the hands of men who would betray it to the forces of clerical authoritarianism. While there were numerous leaders of his new Christian Democratic (D.C.) party who leaned in that direction, DeGasperi himself certainly did not. Throughout his life this staunch anti-Fascist had preached the necessity of avoiding one-party government by the Catholics in a country like Italy where there is a deep-seated conflict between Church and State. Even when the D.C. held a parliamentary majority, he sought the collaboration of the Center laic democratic parties, turning his back upon the Leftist Social-Communist bloc and the Rightist Monarcho-Fascist bloc. The 73-year-old statesman's dying advice to his party in 1954 was to avoid any attempt at Catholic self-sufficiency or political "integralism."

A STABLE CENTER

Because of Italy's strategic location and possession of the largest Communist party outside the "Iron Curtain," the entire world focused its attention on that country's first parliamentary elections, April 18, 1948. Fearing a Communist victory, many Rightists threw their support to the D.C., enabling it to win by itself 48.5 per cent of the popular vote and an absolute majority in the Chamber. When the ballots of the small laic allies—the Republicans, Liberals, and Social Democrats—were included, the Center had 61.9 per cent of the popular vote.

As a result, Italy enjoyed stable government for the next five years, and Westerners came to regard Premier DeGasperi as a permanent fixture. But while he enjoyed popularity in most Western capitals, the aging statesman steadily lost support at home, partly because of the reluctance of his faction-ridden party to initiate thoroughgoing socio-economic reforms. Local elections in 1951 and 1952 revealed significant losses by the Center coalition.

Expecting trouble in the quinquennial parliamentary elections of 1953, the Center parties enacted a "bonus law" which they hoped would assure them effective control. According to it, any coalition winning at

least 50.01 per cent of all the votes would get two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. If less than an absolute majority were obtained, the seats would be distributed on a strictly proportional representation basis.

This ill-advised measure was bitterly denounced by the Left and the Right, and ironically it caused serious defections from the Center coalition itself. When the ballots were counted, the D.C. found that it had only 40.08 per cent, and the Center bloc all told a mere 49.8 per cent of the vote; the Monarcho-Fascist Right, 12.7 per cent; and the Social Communist Left, 35.3 per cent. To govern effectively, the D.C. needed additional support—either from the Monarchists (P.N.M.) or from Pietro Nenni's Left-wing Socialists (P.S.I.). Neither solution seemed feasible. The Monarchists were anathema to the ardently republican parties of the Center; Nenni, while anxious to bring his P.S.I. into the government, was unwilling to break his "unity of action" pact with the Communists (P.C.I.). Consequently, the frustrated democratic Center has been wobbling on the political fulcrum since 1953.

Within a few months after the fateful 1953 elections Premier DeGasperi was thrown out of office, and a year later he died. Since then four younger Christian Democrats have attempted to lead the country—the conservative financier, Giuseppe Pella; the "Left corporativist" and "integralist," Amintore Fanfani; the tough-fibred Sicilian, Mario Scelba, organizer of the efficient post-war police; and most recently the reformist-minded, scholarly Antonio Segni, the first Sardinian ever to hold the reins of government.

Meanwhile, in April, 1955, an end came to the term of the first President of the Republic, the distinguished 81-year-old Torinese Liberal and professor of economics, Luigi Einaudi. In a surprising upset, Parliament elected as the new Head of the State Giovanni Gronchi, a 67-year-old Left-wing Christian Democratic veteran of the underground struggle against Mussolini and President of the Chamber of Deputies since 1948. Despite his religion, Gronchi won widespread support from the anticlericals, who incidentally have become more outspoken since the Church's intervention in

the 1948 campaign put an end to the truce of the Resistance era. They are fearful of Catholic domination of the school system, but trust Gronchi; in fact, Giuseppe Saragat, leader of the Social Democrats, declared that Gronchi was "more laical than the laics."

What was most exciting was that the new Chief of State was determined to make the Presidency of the Republic more than a ceremonial office. In his inaugural address, almost as dramatic as the first of Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Gronchi strongly recommended an "opening to the Left." By this he meant that the boxed-in Center government should seek reinforcement by the inclusion of Nenni's P.S.I. provided it broke the tight "unity of action" pact with the P.C.I. and came out in favor of Italy's Western orientation.

He also advocated rapid implementation of many neglected clauses of the Republican Constitution, and especially the creation of a Constitutional High Court. This long overdue supreme tribunal was finally organized in 1956 by the Segni government. Doubtless it will eventually sweep away many anomalous "carry-overs" of legislation from the Fascist era—a subject which has caused no end of vexation to many idealists who fought in the Resistance.

In February, 1956, President Gronchi made a state visit to Washington, where he delivered an address to Congress that by its frankness helped to dispel the doubts some Americans had expressed regarding his attitude toward NATO. Contending that the world was less secure than it had been a year or two ago, the President pointed to North Africa and Asia as evidence. The Cold War, he observed, was giving way to peaceful competition, colored by the development of national independence movements and the inevitable adjustment of social structures. In the struggle between Western democracy and Marxian-Leninism, the democratic system must be strengthened and Atlantic solidarity reinforced.

NATO has served a good purpose by helping to overcome the world's military imbalance, the President conceded, but it is now necessary to bring it "into line with today's realities." Article Two of the NATO charter should be vitalized, and it should be

supplemented by better coordination of existing international agencies like the Organization of European Economic Cooperation, the European Steel and Coal Community, Western European Union, and the Council of Europe. Indeed, he concluded, the "central problem of the day is the reorganization of the Western World" and "more practical international economic cooperation." Italy's main contribution to the strengthening of NATO must, per force, be her own internal stabilization.²

UPSWING IN NENNI'S STRENGTH

On May 27-28, 1956, nationwide elections were held for municipal and provincial councils. Observers cocked their ears for signs that might offer guidance for the realignment of the parliamentary blocs which since 1953 have been virtually deadlocked. They were not hard to interpret.

The extreme Right suffered reverses almost everywhere—thanks in large measure to the fortuitous settlement of the Trieste problem. In many places the D.C. registered at least some improvement over its previous showing. Doubtless it benefited from belated agrarian reforms and public works policies, as well as from the mild economic boom now in progress. The Center splinter parties—and especially Saragat's Social Democrats (P.S.D.I.)—made a remarkable comeback after their abysmal showing in 1953.

On the extreme Left the P.C.I. tide was checked for the first time since the war. The most influential causes of this seem to be the bewilderment produced by "de-Stalinization"; industrial recovery; general weariness with what appears to be futile agitation; and the government's land reform program. Most of the Communist defectors seem to have been siphoned off to Nenni's left-wing P.S.I.

Indeed, it was Nenni's startling gains—38 per cent in Turin, 42 per cent in Genoa, and nearly double his previous vote in Florence—that provided the most interesting aspect of the recent elections. In many cities Nenni's support (provided he can be separated from the Communists) will be

² Giovanni Gronchi, "The Present Position of Italy," *Vital Speeches*, XXII (Mar. 15, 1956), 324-26.

needed by the Center parties if they are to organize manageable governments, particularly since most Christian Democrats seem to be shying away from any thought of collaboration with the Monarchists.

Exhilarated by the gains registered both by Nenni's P.S.I. and Saragat's P.S.D.I., both wings of Italian Socialism see a chance of reuniting their movement into a bloc that would comprise more than one-fourth of the electorate—a possibility which terrifies the Fanfani wing of the D.C.

To this idea, Nenni is certainly receptive; after all, Socialist unity has been almost a fetish with him ever since he joined the Marxists in 1919. Prior to that year this colorful politician had been a member of the turbulent Republican party, and in 1911 shared a prison cell for awhile with Mussolini—a fellow Romagnole whose career also involved a shift from Republicanism to Marxism. In 1919, Nenni was briefly identified with the early Fascist movement in Bologna, but thereafter he quickly burned his bridges and entered the Socialist party, in which he rapidly became one of the chief spokesmen of its revolutionary or "maximalist" wing.

Nenni blamed the Italian Socialist schisms after World War I—which resulted not only in a Communist but separate "reformist" and "maximalist" Socialist parties—for opening the way to the Fascist dictatorship. Setting out to rectify the situation while he was an émigré in France, he managed by 1930 to reunite the "reformists" and "maximalists," and in 1934 he agreed to a "unity of action" pact with the P.C.I. The latter was broken in August, 1939, on the occasion of the Russo-German neutrality treaty but was revived after the overthrow of Mussolini and Nenni's release from internment.

The subservience of Nenni to the post-war Communist line—which eventually was to gain him a Stalin Peace Prize (since re-labelled)—led to the secession of Saragat and the Social Democrats from the P.S.I. in 1947, as well as to the expulsion of both the P.S.I. and P.C.I. from the government.

At the present time there seems to be a real chance that Nenni may break with the P.C.I. and join the P.S.D.I., with the hope of entering the government. He is both a

realist and an opportunist, and cannot have failed to note the loss of Communist strength in the labor confederations during the past two years. To be sure, the Communists still control the majority of workers through their C.G.I.L. but the rival Catholic-dominated C.I.S.L. and Socialist-Republican U.I.L. labor organizations have made noteworthy gains in recent shop-steward elections and have even displaced the Communists in several key industries. These C.G.I.L. setbacks are largely the result of the workers' weariness with ideological extremism, although American diversion of "off-shore" military procurement contracts from Communist-controlled industries may be a factor in some cases.

COMMUNIST PROBLEMS

Certainly the most important element in the current crisis in the Social-Communist bloc is the down-grading of Stalin. While not the cause of Nenni's flirtation with the democratic Center, it at least has provided him with a good pretext. The denigration of the late Soviet dictator obviously embarrassed Palmiro Togliatti, who has no inferiority complex himself and who spent many years close to Stalin.

In an interview on June 17, 1956, Togliatti conceded that Nikita Khrushchev's criticism, "most of which came unexpectedly, has certainly struck the Communist international framework, and also, in a lesser degree, its masses." He implied that Stalin's "errors" evidently were not so considered in the past by the "ruling cadres" in Moscow, and he pointedly rejected Khrushchev's excuse that "a change was made impossible solely by the presence of military, police, and terroristic apparatus." Togliatti chided the new Kremlin leaders for not having been in the past "more prudent in their public and solemn exaltation of the qualities of this man."³

If Togliatti was discomfited by the revelation of Stalin's "errors" during his "later years," Nenni reacted with moral indignation. "It is evident that the massacres disclosed by Khrushchev involve responsi-

³Palmiro Togliatti interview with a correspondent of *Nuovi Argomenti*, published in the P.C.I. organ, *Unità*, June 17, 1956, and reprinted in *Problems of Communism*, V (July-Aug. 1956), pp. 7-8.

bilities . . . of the whole directive apparatus," he declared. Yet "an attempt is not even made to answer the question: 'How and why could these things come to pass?'" Collective leadership is "preferable to the direction of one man, but it is nevertheless no guarantee of democratic life."

The whole problem of Soviet society, the whole problem of the popular democracies that have followed in the footsteps of Soviet society, is reduced to the necessity for internal democratization, for the circulation of ideas, in a word for political liberty, a necessity which has lain below the surface of Soviet society for many years. It is substantially a question of . . . creating means and instruments for the formation of the free political initiative of the citizen, without there hanging over his head the accusation of being an enemy of the people, a deviationist, a saboteur. . . . In this sense the Soviet crisis concerns not only the so-called errors of Stalin, but the Soviet system. . . .⁴

Meanwhile within the P.C.I. a group of leaders including Luigi Longo, Pietro Secchia, and some others who prefer "direct action" to parliamentary struggle were displeased that Togliatti did not go further in his criticism of the Khrushchev report. Faced with dissension from both sides, Togliatti hastily prepared a three-hour report which he read to the party central committee on June 24. Sounding more critical of Khrushchev than he had a week before, he predicted a "new way" of democracy in the U.S.S.R.

Although he conceded that the substance of the charges against Stalin was true, he declared that they should have been presented in better form and directly to the various Communist parties. He went on to advocate bilateral relations among Communist parties, thereby giving a new fillip to the current "polycentrist" tendency of international Communism.

With respect to future party strategy in Italy, Togliatti overruled advocates of "direct action" and insisted firmly that Parliament offered the "only" practical road to power. Emphasizing the need for avoiding isolation, he indicated that he expected Nenni to remain loyal to the "unity of action" pact.⁵ The P.C.I., however, must seek additional allies, and not just the

peasants but "the masses of the working and middle class in the cities." These must be made to understand that they will not become victims of the building of a Socialist society but will collaborate in its management, declared the veteran leader of many a Popular Front drive.⁶

At the end of June, Nenni renewed his criticism of Communist behavior when he publicly deplored the policies that produced the Poznan uprising. Likewise, his dalliance with Saragat's P.S.D.I. became more intimate. Pierre Commin, the French Assistant Secretary of the Socialist International and an old friend, visited him during the summer, and contacts were made with French Socialists and British Laborites. On the occasion of Egyptian President Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal, Nenni, who is aware of Italy's economic stake in the Canal's unfettered operation and is fearful of "pan-Arab nationalism," put himself against the Communists by sharply criticizing the "Napoleon of Islam."

At the end of August he confirmed that he and Saragat had been holding lengthy conversations and had "examined fundamental aspects of foreign and domestic policy on a Socialist and democratic basis. . . . On all problems our viewpoints converged I hope there will be no break [with the Communists]. I also hope there will be the closest rapprochement between the two Socialist parties."⁷

There the mystery stands. Will Nenni break unequivocally with the P.C.I. and merge with the smaller P.S.D.I.? If so, will he accept its reformist and democratic principles, as well as NATO and Western solidarity, or will he insist upon a neutralist foreign policy and an antiquated "maximalist" domestic program? Does he hope to amalgamate the Socialists as a prelude to a Popular Front with a "democratized" P.C.I.?

Whatever his ultimate goals may be,

⁴ Pietro Nenni in the P.S.I. organs, *Mondo operaio* and *Avanti!*, June 23 and 24, 1956, reprinted in *Problems of Communism*, V (July-Aug. 1956), p. 8.

⁵ A little later, Longo hinted that he might reveal some embarrassing information about Nenni's behavior during the Anti-Fascist emigration if the P.S.I. leader broke his pact.

⁶ *The New York Times*, June 26, 1956.

⁷ *The New York Times*, Sept. 2, 1956.

Nenni certainly will bargain hard for a dominant position in the resurgent and rapidly evolving Socialist movement. For the moment he and Saragat seem to be content with continuous consultation between their parties, to be followed by a joint platform in the next parliamentary elections (scheduled for 1958, or perhaps a year sooner), and finally merger.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Among the many Italian economic and social problems demanding attention are the conservation and development of natural resources, reduction of population pressure and unemployment, Southern land reform, a more equitable and less evadable tax system, expansion of national productivity, and control of monopolies. Most of these are an old story. What is new is that the people and the government, sometimes with foreign assistance and prodding, are at last beginning to cope with them. Although miracles cannot be expected, many of the old stereotypes about Italy may soon be discarded or at least modified.

Tangible forces for change include the post-war discoveries of great natural gas and petroleum deposits. By 1953, natural gas output reached a rate equivalent to 45 million tons of coal a year, thus saving Italy over a third of her annual coal imports. It is known that in Sicily there are some 100 million barrels of oil, while on the mainland there are at least 10 million.

In Sicily, generous legislation by the Regional Parliament has enabled foreign capital to undertake vast drilling operations, but on the mainland the bugaboo about "foreign monopolies" has made it possible for the government E.N.I. (National Hydrocarbon Authority) to keep its own monopoly in the Po valley. Elsewhere, private companies may work side by side with the government, royalties to be shared with the State on a graduated scale. With income taxes added, the State may well get more than half of the profits from the more productive wells.⁸

Unemployment has hovered at about two million since the war, and an additional two million people are inadequately employed.

Population pressure remains great, especially in the South. But a definite downward trend in the birthrate is apparent—in the North it has dropped from 31 to 17 per thousand since World War I; in the South, from 34 to 27.

While emigration is still imperative, it is hardly likely that other countries will agree to any substantial increase over the present quotas. Italian leaders have begun to reconcile themselves to this and are seriously considering ways of alleviating the situation at home. Fundamental to any solution, of course, is expansion of industrialization and national productivity in order to absorb the unemployed and raise purchasing power.

Already there is some reason for guarded optimism. Industrial production is now almost double that of 1938, while agricultural production is about 20 per cent higher. Foreign trade was up 11 per cent in 1955 over 1954. Expanded facilities for vocational training are being organized in many parts of the country.⁹

The tremendous problem of the neglected South is being attacked at last. Significant land redistribution measures have gone into effect in Calabria and several other regions. After the first five years of the program, it was reported in May, 1955, that some 700,000 hectares of land had been expropriated and 500,000 distributed to 92,389 peasant families. They obtained holdings averaging about ten acres.

In the reform areas some 18,000 new houses had been built; 32 farm village-centers were established; 4,000 tractors put into operation; and 4,600 kilometers of roads constructed. The "Fund for the South" (*Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*) intends to spend some \$2 billion by 1963; its development program is now about one-third complete.¹⁰

In January, 1955, the late Ezio Vanoni, Minister for the Budget, announced a ten-year developmental plan which still remains at the top of the government's agenda. Briefly, the ambitious—perhaps overly so—scheme aims at increasing national income by augmenting investments by \$56 billion in all sectors, thereby creating four million

⁸ *The Economist*, July 28, 1956, p. 306.

⁹ *Italian Affairs*, V (July 1956), 1309-21 ff.

¹⁰ Grindrod, *Rebuilding of Italy*, pp. 203-6.

new jobs by 1964. Encouragement will be given to private investors, but the government will prepare over-all plans and will intervene directly in the fields of agriculture, public utilities, public works, and housing.¹¹

If the Vanoni Plan is to succeed, obviously there must be international tranquillity and a long period of stable, efficient government to induce foreigners to invest. The domestic amassment of capital will necessitate uninterrupted production and higher taxes; indeed "tightening of the belt" at all social levels may be necessary for several years.

In a democracy such sacrifices can be

achieved only on the basis of majority consent. Thus there will be additional pressure on the Center coalition government to broaden its parliamentary base by an "opening to the Left"; by the same token, there will be greater reason for Nenni to break with the P.C.I. to enter the government where he can share in the planning and administration of the Vanoni project. The outcome of this political crisis may well determine the extent and speed of the reform of the social and economic structure.

¹¹ George H. Hildebrand, "The Postwar Italian Economy: Achievements, Problems, and Prospects," *World Politics*, VIII (Oct., 1955), 46-70.



"By all means it is to be looked to, that the trunk of Nebuchadnezzar's tree of monarchy be great enough to bear the branches and the boughs; that is, that the natural subjects of the crown or state bear a sufficient proportion to the stranger subjects that they govern. Therefore all states that are liberal of naturalization towards strangers are fit for empire. For to think that an handful of people can, with the greatest courage and policy in the world, embrace too large extent of dominion, it may hold for a time, but it will fail suddenly. The Spartans were a difficult and jealous people in point of naturalization; whereby, while they kept their compass, they stood firm; but when they did spread, and their boughs were become too great for their stem, they became a windfall upon the sudden. Never was any state in this point so open to receive strangers into their body as were the Romans; therefore it sorted with them accordingly, for they grew to the greatest monarchy. Their manner was to grant naturalization, which they called the right of citizenship, and to grant it in the highest degree, that is, not only the right of commerce, the right of marriage, the right of inheritance; but also, the right of voting, and the right of bearing office; and this not to single persons alone, but likewise to whole families; yea, to cities, and sometimes to nations. Add to this their custom of plantation of colonies, whereby the Roman plant was removed into the soil of other nations: and putting both constitutions together, you will say, that it was not the Romans that spread upon the world, but it was the world that spread upon the Romans: and that was the surest way of greatness. . . ."

Francis Bacon, *De Augmentis*.

"Britain needs a peaceful and prosperous Western Europe as urgently as Western Europe needs a thriving Britain," says this author, noting that Britain's vital economic problems "can be solved only by long periods in which her efficient parliamentary machinery and democratic traditions have time enough for considered action."

Precarious Security in Britain

BY ALZADA COMSTOCK

Professor Emeritus of Economics, Mount Holyoke College

THE immediate future probably offers a greater threat to Britain's economic security than to her military safety. Given some years or decades of peace, the country's economic and financial problems are sure to require all the brains and stamina that can be mustered, from Whitehall to the long gray streets of Birmingham.

Holding up the volume of high-grade manufactured exports, finding the foreign currency for buying the food and raw materials unavailable at home, keeping inflation away from the door, persuading management and labor to be patriotically modest in their demands for gains—what government can promise to solve any one of these problems, let alone all? At the same time the commitments to the Commonwealth, many of them economically valuable and a few burdensome, must be honored; and relations with the complex of continental Europe must be kept as smooth as possible, with a minimum of damage to the home effort.

The standing of British exports in peacetime world trade can safely be predicted. Products sent abroad tend more and more to consist of quality goods and those that require some special kind of know-how. In

the first part of 1956, machinery and electrical appliances made up from one-quarter to one-third of all British exports. Road vehicles and aircraft stood second and chemicals third. At the same time the country was importing far more costly amounts of food and raw materials for the metallurgical and textile industries.

The problem is to increase exports until they cover (roughly, for there are usually other sources of income) the cost of imports. And the trouble is that because of inflation at home, British exports tend to be priced high in world markets. The situation is not yet serious, but it will become so if inflation is not controlled. Although 1956 started off as a good year, with exports increasing faster than imports, by the beginning of September there was some bad news: a sharp drop in the sterling area's gold and dollar reserves to \$2.276 million, only \$276 million above what economists have long regarded as the danger line.

Although this was partly seasonal, that slight margin of safety has been touched too often in recent years—much too often to prophesy that in the next few years Britain can do much better. At the time of the recent announcement of the figures the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, warned the nation that "we live and work very near the margin of safety" and appealed to workers and businessmen to hold the price line against an inflation "now as grave as the Suez Canal crisis."

Prices have been rising in Britain because the increase in people's money incomes has

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been growing faster than production. It is estimated that in 1955 the output per man-year increased by about four per cent, while profits, wages, rents, dividends and interest grew at double that rate. This has increased production costs, and although average export prices have not yet grown correspondingly, they are bound to do so if the rise is not checked.

Once set in motion, these impulses bound and rebound. With rising incomes the British people's demand for consumer goods has increased, and they have been buying products from the very industries which should have been increasing exports. At the same time, domestic users have been better able to import consumer goods from foreign countries—clothing, shoes, travel appurtenances and the like—and they have been getting them at a sharply increased rate. Thus the public's better buying power has harmed the country along both critical lines: it has limited exports and increased imports.

In the past months the Government has done what it can, in a country where controls are familiar but still unwelcome. Borrowing for domestic expansion has been attacked by raising the Bank of England's interest rate to 5.5 per cent and by urging the commercial banks to cut down their loans. Consumer demand has been slowed by raising the selective sales tax ("purchase tax") to 60 per cent on cars, radios and TV sets, washing machines and many other "consumer durables." Even ordinary household goods now suffer the tax, though at a lower rate. The down payment on installment purchases has been raised to 50 per cent, with a marked deterrent effect on the buying of cars and other metal-using products.

The Government has cut down its own inflationary expenditure by reducing the subsidies on housing, bread and milk. It has put pressure on the nationalized industries, particularly transportation, coal mining and power, to hold prices steady and to refrain from granting wage increases. It has limited its own capital expenditure and that of the nationalized industries, and by making borrowing more difficult and expensive it has forced the local governments to reduce their own capital outlays, particularly on new housing.

At first it appeared that these measures were too limited to get at the core of the inflation problem and the inadequate volume of exports. By the end of 1955 the public's buying spree on household goods had been slowed, but the capital goods industries were still operating at full speed. The feeling grew, in the Cabinet and elsewhere, that only a cut in the Government's defense spending—nine per cent of the national income as against five per cent for the Western European countries, according to Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan—could dampen inflation and spur exports. If Britain could drop to the Continental level of defense spending and "if we got only half [of the saving] shifted into exports it would completely transform the foreign balance," said Mr. Macmillan.

By the beginning of September, 1956, the situation looked better; that is to say, it looked worse. "End of the Boom?" was the title of a summary article by the *Manchester Guardian's* financial editor. Board of Trade figures showed that inventories were rising. Industry's investment plans for 1957 were lower than for 1956 and showed the first drop in three years. The financial editor wrote:

The bulge is moving through the pipe line. It is past the warehouse stage and has got to the point where lines of finished cars lie in the fields waiting to be sold. This increase in stocks represents rising inventories—the classic danger signal in industry. [But] it would be wrong to assume that this is happening everywhere. The heavy engineers sell all they can make.

It is sad and sometimes tragic that the only cure for inflation involves recession and a certain amount of unemployment, but in the case of Britain the cure is certainly not worse than the disease, for Britain's long-term economic security and value to the trading nations of the world is a first concern. Unemployment had already shown its ugly head, particularly in the automobile industry, although the loss was small in comparison with the great gains in automobile employment in the preceding three years.

An increase in production costs through effective demands for higher wages was one of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's bogies

in the late summer of 1956, when many of the brakes applied to inflation seemed at last to be operating. Foreseeing the probable course of the Trades Union Congress meeting at Brighton in early September, Mr. Macmillan held a press conference on August 29, in which he showed that while retail prices had risen 24 per cent since the beginning of 1951, wage rates had risen 34 per cent and earnings even more. Further increases in wage rates, he added, except where accompanied by increased productivity, might well begin to make the cost of Britain's exports uncompetitive.

The Trades Union Congress took the admonitions in a hostile spirit. Unanimously and with shouts of approval, the Congress adopted on September 5 the following resolution:

By abandoning economic controls on the plea of setting the people free, the Government left the economy to drift and deprived itself of the most effective means of recovering control in a crisis

[The Congress] rejects proposals to recover control by wage restraint, and by using the nationalized industries as a drag-anchor for the drifting national economy.

Behind the resolution were the Congress' dislike of the Government's attempt to check rising prices by inducing the nationalized industries to hold prices steady and avoid wage increases, its desire for the return of some import controls, and its program for higher taxation of large incomes and business profits. At the same time, resolutions passed at the general meeting are not binding upon the member unions, many of which are more moderate in their wage demands than the September resolution would suggest. In view of its great power, the British trade union movement has been fairly moderate in its demands over the past decade.

One of the policy questions facing the British trade unionists concerns automation. A report published for the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research in May stated that the United Kingdom, dependent on overseas trade, must lead in exploiting the possibilities of automation, for there is

no alternative in a world that grows more competitive almost by the week.

The report reflects the general concern about the effect of automation on employment, and admits that switches in skills and possibly changes in the location of labor will be required. The authors believe that such problems can be solved, as they were solved during World War II, by careful planning and training of workers. They do not fear that automation will come quickly and catastrophically tomorrow, with much displacement of labor and shortages of capital. Rather, they are afraid that the change will come too slowly to keep the nation in a competitive position in world markets.

None of the problems are unique to Britain; yet together they make up a complex which sets the country apart in its plans for healthy growth if a long period of peace makes such a development possible. The "export or die" dilemma, phrased long ago by Hitler, involves the maintenance of a high standard of living on the precarious base of extreme dependence on foreign supplies of food and raw materials. There are powerful groups to be dealt with: a strong trade union group, a disgruntled and semi-impooverished middle class, and powerful industrialists who still think in terms of nineteenth century individualism and high profits. The individual problems may not be unique, but the complex is not matched in any other country.

THE COMMONWEALTH

There is much more time for speculation and less urgency for immediate action with respect to the future of the Commonwealth. A meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, such as that which was held in London in late June and early July, 1956, always brings a spate of philosophizing about the place of the Commonwealth in the years of peace that are hoped for. Is the Commonwealth due to expire, slowly and peacefully? Should it be merged with the United Nations? Is Britain alienating the countries of Western Europe by deferring always to its commitments to the Commonwealth?

Curiously enough, most of these specula-

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By CHITOSHI YANAGA, *Yale University.*

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tions come from Britain. Among the other members there is usually a high value placed upon the Commonwealth association. It is the meeting together as equals that the members seem to value. What the exchange of information means to them nobody knows, for the final communiqués are always masterpieces of generalization. And of course the Prime Ministers of the member countries, like the financial and trade officials who have sometimes met, can make no decisions which would bind their own completely independent Parliaments.

The communiqués hint that considerable time is usually given to foreign affairs. On relations among the members they are always more explicit. India retained membership as a republic after 1950, accepting the Sovereign as "the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and, as such, as head of the Commonwealth." Pakistan was a republic in 1955. Thus it was only to be expected that the July, 1956, communiqué should reveal that the Prime Ministers accepted the new Ceylon Government's proposal to introduce a republican form of government within the Common-

wealth. Nor was it a surprise to learn that the Rhodesian Federation would now become a permanent member of the conference.

In spite of the Prime Ministers' obvious pleasure and satisfaction in their meetings, occasionally a proposal for altering the work of the conference comes from a source other than politically-conscious Britain. An idea that appears to come from India is this: In the past many of the deliberations have dealt with foreign policy, and an effort has been made, within the very narrow limits imposed by the nature of the Commonwealth, to work towards unity. The time for such an emphasis is past. Today the Commonwealth should stand before the world as a group which believes and practices freedom and toleration, a position which can be taken even when the member nations pursue different foreign policies.

Speaking of such proposals as these, *The Economist* said on July 14, 1956:

To cast about feverishly for a new means of keeping the Commonwealth together is to put an absurd little cart before a perfectly healthy horse If the member nations begin to invent new functions and ideological codes, so that the Commonwealth may survive, they will be going about things in a way which will damage both the Commonwealth and the ideals which it should serve.

New functions will in any case be added unto it as the number of its sovereign members grows. And as to ideology, it needs to be recalled that common ideals do not automatically lead nations to associate What can and should be done, however, is to get the horse in front of the cart; to make the fullest use of the Commonwealth to promote democratic ideals, instead of relying upon those ideals to prop up the Commonwealth.

Obviously there is no consensus as to the functions of the Commonwealth in time of peace, and no agreement as to whether it should be prodded or left alone. There has been for a long time, however, a demand for various subordinate commissions or councils. The Commonwealth has no central organization or secretariat—Canada, for one, has always opposed such establishments—but a Commonwealth Relations Office exchanges information with the Foreign Offices of the various countries. Requests for new

bodies include: a Commonwealth council for scientific research; a committee for the coordination of university work; and inter-Commonwealth study groups at an unofficial level.

BRITAIN AND EUROPE

Britain needs a peaceful and prosperous Western Europe as urgently as Western Europe needs a thriving Britain. Yet Britain's foreign economic policy with respect to that vital area has been obscure for a long time. Commonwealth obligations, particularly "imperial preference," make it difficult for Britain to enter wholeheartedly into proposals for a common European market. At the same time she needs greater freedom of non-dollar trade, for the fear of an American recession is ever-present in Britain.

At the O.E.E.C. meetings in July, 1956, Britain proposed the setting up of a working party to study ways of associating other O.E.E.C. countries with the project for a common market for the six Schuman plan countries. This represented an unusual degree of initiative, and home opinion tended to be cynical. Taken at its face value, however, the action could mean that Britain

understood the dangers of standing out against the reducing of European tariff barriers. Keeping the walls high would mean surrendering European industrial leadership to Germany, already a formidable competitor in European and world markets. Britain's chief exporting industries might find themselves outside a barrier which now, with their domestic costs high, they could not surmount.

For the maintenance of her present order Britain needs a peaceful, productive Europe and a peaceful, productive North America, with as few obstructions to trade as can be managed. It may be an exaggeration to say that she needs decades of peace for survival. The record of World War II is still too vivid for that. But she does need peace for economic security. Her problems are long-term problems, deeply imbedded in her economy; problems of high-grade manufacture and high-grade exports, dependent upon vital imports. They antedate World War II and even World War I, but they have been intensified by both. They can be solved only by long periods in which her efficient parliamentary machinery and democratic traditions have time enough for considered action.



STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, AND JULY 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) of CURRENT HISTORY, published monthly at Philadelphia, Pa., for October, 1956.

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(Seal)

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(My commission expires February 4, 1958.)

"There has emerged in the past year considerable doubt as to the relevancy of NATO, at least in its present form and function, to emerging realities of international relations." Here is a study of our changing role as a NATO member in "a somewhat delicate period."

United States Policy in Europe

BY ROSS N. BERKES

Director of the School of International Relations, University of Southern California

AMERICAN policy toward Western Europe has been vigorously directed, particularly since the height of the Cold War, toward the advancement of five broad goals: 1) economic and political stability; 2) economic and political integration; 3) military strength and integration; 4) creation and development of a North Atlantic community to link Western Europe with ourselves and Canada; and 5) consolidation of Western Germany into Western Europe.

In pursuit of the first two goals, approximately three-fourths of our foreign aid in the 1948-1955 period was directed to Western Europe: a sum totalling over \$14 billion. The construction of NATO, our defense commitments under NATO, military aid appropriations, our strong encouragement of the ill-fated E.D.C., and our more successful support of the Paris Agreements and the new Western European

Union—such have been the more recent manifestations of policies on behalf of these goals.

Much of the driving force behind our policies, and even much of the argumentation on behalf of the goals themselves has been to stress them as necessary responses to the menace of Soviet-Communist aggression. It was therefore almost inevitable that significant changes in Soviet-Communist tactics and behavior would not only encourage the development of new assumptions regarding the nature of the Soviet-Communist menace, but would also create doubts as to the continued validity of some of our policies and even of some of our goals. These doubts have been stimulated, particularly in Western Europe, by a growing optimism about replacing the norms of the Cold War by new norms of peaceful coexistence; a hope combined with a growing uneasiness that continuance of some of these policies and goals would imperil the hope of peaceful coexistence.

Much, therefore, of what we have thought essential for the security and welfare of Western Europe—and therefore for our own security and welfare—is beginning to be imperiled, or at least faced with growing demands for radical readjustment. It is under these circumstances that not only our policies but also our goals deserve careful consideration, particularly with reference to Germany, Western European integration and NATO.

The complex of overlapping patterns and machinery for European integration has

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largely been supported in the interest of three considerations: 1) the necessity for greater economic productivity and stability in the area as a whole; 2) the needed strength these results would bring in resisting communism and Communist aggression; and 3) the protections such integration would provide in bringing Western Germany, at least, back into the Western European community. All efforts, however, to achieve a general integration by means of an over-all political approach have been unsuccessful, and have clearly seemed out of reach—at least so long as Britain remains aloof and unwilling to counterbalance the inclusion of Western Germany. Britain, because of her special ties with both the Commonwealth and the United States, has preferred to express her encouragement of and relationships with Western European integration indirectly, and through NATO.

The most successful patterns of integration, therefore, have been functional, in both economic and military fields. While these have been uneven and subject to varying memberships and obligations, they have begun to take hold. Now these patterns are laying the background for a bolder and more imaginative effort to establish a common market for the Western European community. The possibilities of this effort will surely be probed during the forthcoming year, and may well lead Britain into a thorough review and possibly a reorientation of her hitherto aloof relations with Western European integration—if only because the British may conclude that they cannot afford to stay out.

WEST GERMANY'S IMPORTANCE

Essentially, the future of most of these programs—and certainly most of their promise—depends upon reciprocal terms of accommodation with Western Germany, which for some time now has clearly emerged as the strongest economic power in Western Europe, second only to the Soviet Union in Europe as a whole. Whether such terms of accommodation can be developed without fuller British participation might well become one of the more critical issues, as it has been in the past.

In the interests of over-all American objectives in Western Europe, further moves in the direction of Western European integration should be encouraged, including placing Western Germany more securely into the framework of the Western European community. Resistance, however, may come from Western Germany itself, where there are increasing evidences of a remobilization of political pressure on behalf of German reunification.

If the Soviet Union can make a convincing case that acceptable terms of reunification might be conceded if Western Germany would break away from Western European integration and NATO, almost every one of our policies and objectives would be affected. Some would be clearly imperiled. There is also evidence of increasing reluctance in other Western European countries, particularly in France, to encourage closer integration with Western Germany, especially if that appears to be a major remaining barrier to the release of Europe from the Cold War.

Soviet attitudes in the past few years have clearly and persistently indicated, particularly to the Germans, that a reunified Germany integrated with the West is unacceptable. Despite a convincing case that the Soviet Union could not afford such a risk, there is not the same degree of intolerance for a democratic and unified Germany at a price.

Molotov's pretense, prior to the Geneva Conference, that he might consider (or rather "reconsider") the Eden Plan for all-German free elections was not explored at Geneva, because the Russians refused to touch the issue independently. This may have been a subtle and perhaps vicious way of keeping German hopes alive. Yet much of the Western German population, and certainly most of the German Social Democratic leadership, remain unconvinced that the Soviet Union will refuse a democratic united Germany at any price; they may have convinced themselves of the probable price and also of their own willingness to pay it.

It would be disconcerting for us, to say the least, if the Soviet Union offered to accept minimal democratic formulas for the reunification of Germany at the price of

German neutralization and the replacement of NATO by a general European security system. So far, the hope of German reunification breaks over persistent and convincing Soviet refusals to entertain the prospect of a democratic united Germany. This may have led us to a complacent self-assurance that the present clarity of the reunification issue could not be muddled by a shifting of the burden of agreement from Soviet to Western—and particularly to American—shoulders.

THE FUTURE OF NATO

The possibility that the new Soviet leadership might concede, or even appear to concede, a neutralized and yet democratic Germany at a price would clearly lead to the anticipation that part of the price would be the dissolution or at least a basic transformation of NATO. Indeed, an apparent Soviet fixation as to the menace and intolerableness of NATO is stressed by the fact (as noted by General Gruenther) that 11 of the 12 speakers at the recent Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow cited NATO's dismemberment as the number one objective of Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet fixation has had the perverse effect, at least in our country, of convincing us more than ever of NATO's great value. Certainly such a reaction is implicit in Mr. Dulles' outspoken conviction, logically difficult to dislodge, that if we want the Soviet Communists to continue to desist from violence, "we had better continue doing the things that have led them to desist."

Whether or not the German reunification question might suddenly reach out to imperil NATO, there has emerged in the past year considerable doubt as to the relevancy of NATO, at least in its present form and function, to emerging realities of international relations. By the spring of 1956, NATO was generally viewed, in the words of Canada's Lester Pearson, as being "at the crossroads of its existence." A wide feeling had developed that the changing mood of Russian leaders should find a reflection in NATO's future development.

The meeting of the NATO Council in

May revealed what one British correspondent described, with apparent accuracy, as "both a unanimous conviction among the governments that NATO is out of touch with the times and a profound divergence about its ultimate destiny." A new "Pearson Committee" has been formed, asked to ponder that ultimate destiny, and to report back at the forthcoming fall meeting of the Council. It is hoped, at least, that we will soon know which turning NATO will take as it passes beyond the crossroads.

The present NATO crisis is in reality a dual one, both elements of which reveal doubts as to the appropriateness of NATO in its present form. The greater emphasis, reflected in the role of the Pearson Committee, relates to the need for developing the bonds of community by supplementing the military functions of NATO with political and economic functions. The lesser emphasis relates to the need for a more thorough-going readjustment of the military function in the light of changes in warfare and the strategy of warfare.

It would be unfair and misleading to suggest that difficulties in facing the political, economic and psychological consequences of changes in strategy and warfare have contributed, by way of diversion, to the relatively greater emphasis on NATO's non-military potentialities. The demand for a more broadly based sense of community stands very much on its own merits. Nonetheless, there is some danger that the emphasis on non-military functions could divert the allies from the more difficult task of adjusting NATO to the newer military realities.

Despite the non-military emphasis, perhaps NATO's crisis is essentially military, born of an increasing recognition that modern war is disastrous, combined with the further logic that the main hope of avoiding such a disaster lies in improving our capacity and readiness to make it more disastrous. Efforts to rally public confidence behind this proposition have brought in their wake a perverse and bewildering draining away of confidence, particularly in Western Europe.

To add to the discouragement, the unsettling effects of such a dilemma have been

in no way offset by the discovery of practical alternatives to this proposition. As pre-eminent and able a statesman as Sir Walter Monckton, Britain's Minister of Defense, could find little solace in exploring the half-way house of "graduated deterrence" during the February Defense Estimates Debate in the House of Commons, since he could see nothing very helpful or even reliable in its twin of "graduated retaliation."

The growing political unbearableness of the prospect of war, joined by faith that the Soviet Union has modified its behavior in the light of this proscription, has led European leaders such as France's Pineau to a belief in the possibility of general rapprochement. Certainly this would appear to be the fuller import of Pineau's remarks in Washington, early this summer, when he observed: "Of course, in the minds of those who still conceive of the possibility of international conflict, the fact that a nation belongs to one camp rules out any contact with the other camp."

By implication, and in some of his further remarks, Pineau was apparently arguing that he, and sensible people in general, no longer conceive of the possibility of international conflict, and that this itself is the harbinger of a new mutuality of reasonableness between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

Within this context the Soviet announcement this spring, that its military manpower would be cut by 1.2 million, led Western Europe somewhat circuitously toward a new realism regarding NATO. It also led to some rather awkward confusion. First, it served as a justification for cuts in military manpower by over-burdened NATO powers. Second, it contributed to the illusion that the Great Powers are reducing their capacity to wage war by a process of voluntary but reciprocal disarmament. Third, it stimulated a growing sense of security and apathy, perhaps in compensation for the threatened descent into the awesome insecurity of the doctrine of deterrence and the balance of terror. Finally, it began to release a burdensome sense of obligation among nearly all of the major NATO powers regarding the extent of their land force commitments to NATO.

In sum, the European NATO powers, no less than the Soviet Union, are moving into the strategy of deterrence and reliance on unconventional weapons, but they have done so largely by the more indirect method of reducing their capacity to implement any other strategy. All of which led Britain's *Daily Telegraph* to conclude that with all of the dedicated fanfare over Britain's determination to produce an H-bomb, Mr. Eden must sometimes mutter as he ponders his problems in the Middle East: "My kingdom for a horse."

It becomes more difficult, under the newer realism, to give a convincing case for the addition of 12 West German divisions—so long heralded and yet still so distant—except partly in terms of relief of others from commitments. Latent Western European uneasiness about German rearmament, manageable while there was more convincing pressure for the urgent build-up of NATO's ground divisions, is again becoming more assertive. West German reluctance to deploy manpower into the economic sterility of military forces is also strengthened. Indeed, the whole issue of German rearmament and of Germany's role in NATO begins to take on a different texture.

Equally, it becomes more difficult for Western Europeans to escape the uneasy feeling that in terms of a strategy of deterrence NATO is predominantly the framework for the deployment of American power, and that the defense of the area rests more clearly than ever on our capacity to deter, and very much less on their military efforts. Few of our allies, including the British, can make an effort proportionate to ours—or to that of the Soviet Union—in the same ratio as their respective efforts under more conventional strategy.

In short, as a military alliance for the defense of Western Europe, NATO is beginning to look increasingly inadequate as an effective instrument of conventional strategy, and is draining Western Europe's capacity to invoke conventional strategy in other areas in the world. It is also becoming increasingly "foreign" and uncomfortable as an American instrument of the newer strategy.

Until now, as the *British Spectator* re-

cently editorialized, the centrifugal forces capable of imperiling NATO have largely been neutralized by Russian pressure. Newer Soviet tactics, and the growing assumption since the Geneva "summit" talks that the Soviet is abandoning violence, have begun to release these centrifugal forces. The future of NATO, even as a defensive alliance, appears increasingly dependent on non-military justifications. Thus the present significance of Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty, with its emphasis on economic and political collaboration as a means of building a community which would hold together automatically whether the international climate be fair or stormy.

If the newer attitudes prevalent in Western Europe, particularly those demanding greater flexibility in diplomatic relations with the Soviet world, are not to be discounted, our efforts to strengthen NATO by developing its economic and political usefulness may have to adjust to this trend. It was relatively easy for all concerned to support the alliance as a military counter to the Soviet military threat to Western Europe. It will be much more difficult to translate NATO into an economic and political counter to Soviet economic and political threats, most of which are outside of Western Europe.

The meddling impact of NATO within the Atlantic community—burdensome as it sometimes has been in terms of building an effective defense force—would be better kept within the community and directed toward constructive efforts at strengthening the bonds of community, rather than extended and refocused outside of the community. Within the community, however, we might have to be tolerant toward more flexible Soviet relations, or else risk defeat.

SUMMARY

Our relations with Western Europe have reached a somewhat delicate period, largely because of the impact on Western European attitudes of new Soviet tactics and a growing assumption of release from threats of violence. The issues of German reunification and the future of NATO—almost inescapably interlinked—are probably the danger

points, since they are most likely to become the critical tests in Western Europe of the viability of coexistence.

The ultimate measure of the problem is likely to be found in NATO, which—as a defensive alliance system (although not necessarily in its present form)—really cannot be placed up for bargain, however tentatively coexistent the two worlds may be or wish to be. NATO could be imperiled, however, either by forcing it to assume added burdens which would work against a sense of community, or by making it too rigid a barrier to the testing of coexistence.

In terms of the former, it would seem clearer than our own present and rather academically distant attitudes allow that one of the real problems of the North Atlantic community is lack of balance. Its political and economic manifestations are unbalanced in being increasingly European, and its military manifestations are unbalanced in being increasingly American. Such a balancing of imbalances does not readily contribute to the building of a permanent sense of community.

In terms of the latter, it would be unwise not to recognize the potential impact of possible shifts of rather dramatic proportions on the issue of German reunification. Nor would it be wise to overlook the possibility that the new Soviet leadership could offer a united and a democratic Germany, for a price that some of our allies might not be adverse to paying, least of all the Germans themselves.

Ultimately, American policy toward Western Europe may be facing, and more rapidly than we might expect, some real tests of whether the institutions and patterns we have vigorously helped to develop in the Cold War should—or even can—survive in the period of newer attitudes brought about by Soviet changes in tactics.

We have grown accustomed to regarding Western Europe as an emergent community, one into which Germany—or at least West Germany—must be brought, and to which we would be linked through NATO and an Atlantic community. These, in large measure, were the by-products of the Cold War in Europe. They could become the heavier stakes of coexistence in Europe.

Books on the New Europe

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

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PRE-OCCUPATION with the post-Stalinist Soviet challenge in the under-developed areas of the Middle East and South Asia has obscured the enduring importance of Western Europe to American security and the future of Western civilization. The headlines stress the Suez Canal crisis, the new Soviet trade and technical assistance offensives, and the continued disarmament impasse in the United Nations. Since the 1955 Summit Conference, there has been a tacit Great Power acceptance of the obsolescence of all-out nuclear war as a possible method of resolving political tensions. But the impact of technology and nucleonics upon strategy, political as well as military, is only in the nascent stage of understanding and study.

Significant European-American tensions exist independent of the Soviet threat. There is the increasingly pertinent question of the extent to which the nuclear age is going to affect United States-European relations. It may well be that the revolution in military weapons, with their attendant strategic and political ramifications, will have serious con-

sequences for the character and direction of American foreign policy. The prospect of a withdrawal of American power from the continent is Western Europe's great unvoiced fear. For example, the recent announcement of the so-called Radford Plan, calling for a decrease in conventional military manpower and a greater reliance on nuclear weapons, is stirring anxieties long latent in Western Europe over the possible recrudescence of American isolationism.

It has had an immediate effect in NATO capitals, especially in Bonn. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's political position has been seriously imperiled as a result of the implications stemming from the Radford Plan. West Germany was drawn into NATO and close alignment with the West largely through his unceasing efforts. Yet now, on the eve of the long sought German rearmament, there is pause for reflection as the spectre of a re-emergent American isolationism appears to confront Europe's leaders. Is such an eventuality likely? With the development of a less belligerent Soviet demeanor, can Europe rely upon an effective continuation of America's commitment to Western European security? In important measure, the answer must be sought within the framework of American thought and domestic politics.

In his latest book, *The New Isolationism*, Norman A. Graebner, Professor of History at Iowa State College, analyzes the domestic forces seeking to bring about a substantive retreat from America's newly accepted, albeit reluctantly, global responsibilities. He has focused attention on the domestic irresponsibility of partisan politics, and its effect upon the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy during the period since 1950. The behavior of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations is subjected to a careful and searching analysis, particularly with respect to foreign policy attitudes resulting

THE NEW ISOLATIONISM. BY NORMAN GRAEBNER. (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956. 289 pages, \$4.00).
STERLING: ITS MEANING IN WORLD FINANCE. BY JUDD POLK. (New York: Harper & Brothers, published for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1956. 286 pages, bibliography and index, \$3.75).
TARGET: THE WORLD; COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN 1956. EDITED BY EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. 362 pages, bibliography and index, \$5.00).
FINLAND: BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. BY ANATOLE G. MAZOUR. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956. 298 pages, appendices and bibliography, \$6.50).

from the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and the emergence of Communist China as the dominant military power on the mainland of Asia. This disillusioning experience, coupled with the Korean impasse, has served to introduce a note of rigidity and dogmatism into American foreign policy which the neo-isolationists have been quick to exploit.

The author's use of the term "new isolationism" is a perceptive choice, though initially the reader may remain skeptical. The "new isolationists" differ from their predecessors of the inter-war period in form and emphasis, but there is an underlying rationale common to both. Undisguised suspicion of Europe, a belief, tacit but nonetheless real, in America's ability to "go it alone," the acceptance of nineteenth century economic orthodoxy as a basis for twentieth century political conservatism, an exaggerated sense of American power and ability to determine the course of events abroad are all elements characterizing the isolationist psyche. But the author goes one step further, making clear the pervasiveness and subtlety of the "new isolationists."

They do not advocate any sudden withdrawal of American power from overseas positions. Rather, they seek to curtail foreign aid expenditures in the interest of a balanced budget. The "new isolationists" do not support any retreat to the Hooverian extremism of "Fortress America," but do deprecate the legitimate difficulties of Western European countries, seeing therein cancerous symptoms of decadence and weakness. They see in China and Korea challenges to American prestige and security which must be met, but shy away from the price demanded of any serious Asian adventure and offer little constructive advice.

On the domestic scene, they are quick to exploit failures in foreign affairs for highly partisan purposes. The pressure and power of the "new isolationists" have brought about a growing inflexibility in foreign policy and a regrettable tendency to veil international problems in moral abstractions, thus making the task of legitimate negotiation with the Soviet Union increasingly difficult. The danger of these groups, as the author so aptly stresses, lies in the rigidity, the emo-

tionalism, and the seemingly facile solutions to complex problem which they engender.

Philosophically, the author is in accord with the Lippmann-Kennan school of thought which laments the deleterious influence of a vacillating and intellectually ill-equipped public opinion. There is a danger, however, in too readily placing an undue blame upon the "capriciousness of the American people in the realm of diplomatic concepts." Similarly, the author may be ascribing too great a responsibility for the ineffectiveness of the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy to the "new isolationists."

Professor Graebner is highly critical of the policy of bluster and bluff implicit in the doctrines of "massive retaliation," "liberation," and "brinkmanship." He rightly notes that slogans, designed largely for domestic consumption, are unacceptable substitutes for intelligence, imagination, and political realism. During the early months of the Eisenhower Administration, the neo-isolationists set loose a Pandora's box of abuse, innuendo, and invective, seldom equalled in American politics, which all but paralyzed the effective operation of the State Department and Foreign Service. The initial passivity of President Eisenhower, an attempt to assuage the neo-isolationists within the Republican party, only resulted in circumscribing the permissible area of negotiation at a time when Stalin's successors were groping toward a new flexibility and expansion of Soviet influence.

The recapitulation of significant foreign policy developments since 1952, with an incisive analysis of the pressures exerted by the "new isolationists" to restrict the Administration's conduct of foreign affairs, may be criticized for a lack of perspective in one important respect. The author's interpretation of the role which neo-isolationist pressure played in determining President Eisenhower's stands on Korea, French Indo-China, Formosa, disarmament, and the Summit Conference is challenging. But he tends to attribute too great an influence to these groups.

Even more important, he does not place commensurate responsibility for major foreign policy decisions, as opposed to *pro-nouncements*, upon the Congressional lead-

ership of the Democratic party. The important crises of the past few years, which required a definite choice of alternatives, were based *de facto* upon bipartisan agreement.

However, the view that the efforts of the President and his Secretary of State to placate the neo-isolationists within the Republican party have resulted in a sharp limitation upon the Administration's freedom of maneuver is effectively presented. The question of competent political leadership, capable of defining American objectives and gaining the convinced cooperation of allies and potential allies, remains. This volume is a worthy addition to the continuing inquiry into the dilemma of our present foreign policy.

Another phase of the broader challenge confronting the Western world is developed by Mr. Judd Polk in *Sterling: Its Meaning in World Finance*. Developed with sophistication and scholarly care, the scope and timeliness of this study make it a must for anyone concerned with postwar international developments in the area of finance. In this case, the focus is on Great Britain and the role of sterling in British international economic thought and policy.

As long as the disparity between the productivity of Europe and the United States persists, regionalism in international trade will supersede any proposed world approach. Of the regional monetary groupings, the sterling bloc remains the most important. Sterling continues to hold a vital position as the principal medium of the international payment system for much of the non-Communist world, though the aftermaths of two world wars have had their weakening effect. But until convertibility becomes feasible, this situation will remain a dominant feature of international economic life.

The persistence of a dollar gap for most countries is ample evidence of the contradictions inherent in America's foreign economic policy and constitutes a source of tension between the United States and its NATO allies. Compelling psychological and political factors for Britain and Western Europe to substitute trade for aid in their economic relationship with the dollar area preclude any significant departure from the

dependence on sterling.

The author is primarily concerned with long term trends within the sterling area and discusses "the relation of the sterling area to the Commonwealth," as well as "Britain's traditional role as the center country." After a brief, interesting development of sterling's history, the author analyzes the 1947-1955 period. Particular attention is given to the sterling reserve crises of 1947, 1949, 1951, which occurred despite United States Marshall Plan aid, the establishment of the European Payments Union, and special sterling area agreements. On the basis of his research, Mr. Polk questions the validity of the commonly held assumption that a recession in the United States must adversely affect the balance of payments of the sterling area in general and Great Britain in particular.

The informal structure of the sterling area is stressed. There is no formal governing authority; it "works on the basis of contracts between the central banks which are pretty continuous . . . and occasional meetings . . . of the Finance Ministers of the member countries." As a result of the informality of the structure, the role of the London money market and the British Treasury assumes a unique significance. This is carefully charted both with respect to Britain's position in the sterling bloc, and in the relation of the independent member countries and dependent territories to these economic institutions and the London center.

Thus far, sterling has acted to facilitate cooperation and encourage wider political associations among the diverse nations comprising the sterling bloc. The author therefore believes that it still has a necessary role to play in world trade. American criticisms, based largely on inconvertibility and discrimination, are presented, as are the present strengths and weaknesses of sterling.

The author has skillfully and succinctly grappled with the complex role of sterling as an instrument of finance, politics, and trade. Presented with remarkable lucidity, the volume should attract wide respect among social scientists. Students of international relations are again indebted to the Council on Foreign Relations for encouraging the publication of this study.

If the need to develop a viable system of

international economic exchange is demanded of the West, an even greater challenge to its future is posed by the global dissemination of Communist ideology, its specious idealism, and the uncritical receptivity with which it is welcomed in much of the world. In this struggle, the power of the printed and spoken word may ultimately prove the decisive weapon. But the dialogue among the Western countries suffers from diffusion, discord, and disinterest. There are no effective articulation and communication of commonly accepted values. Similarly, and more obviously inadequate, are Western efforts to understand and be understood by the nationalisms of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

The Communists, on the other hand, are highly sensitive to the importance of propaganda in human affairs and have "harnessed technology and psychology to persuade, convince, confuse, demoralize, and control." In *Target: The World; Communist Propaganda Activities in 1955*, edited by Evron M. Kirkpatrick, we have an important addition to the literature concerned with the character and conduct of world Communist propaganda operations. Until now, there has been a singular lack of attention devoted to this phase of Communist global activity. The present volume should do much to fill this need.

To the Soviet leaders, propaganda has always been considered a necessary concomitant of infiltration and eventual subversion. As an instrument of policy, propaganda is carefully and continually utilized so as to maximize its effectiveness. The opening chapters deal with the organization of the propaganda apparatus and its relation to the Communist Party. Before developing, in detail, the propaganda themes stressed by the Communist international movement in the various regions of the world, a review of the main propaganda tactics of 1955 is presented. With totalitarian thoroughness, the Communist propaganda effort employs all forms of communications media; due care is given to the peculiarities of the target areas and groups. Though the amount of money expended can only be guessed, the enormous scope of the operations indicates a figure dwarfing comparable Western outlays.

Some of the most valuable sections of this book deal with regional analyses of Communist propaganda activities. In each area the principal themes are discussed, techniques of dissemination examined, and the most important front groups mentioned. At the present time, there is apparently a clear parallelism between Soviet and Communist Chinese propaganda efforts. But it should be noted that they are separately administered, indicating that both are seeking to infiltrate, influence, and sway the uncommitted nations of South Asia independent of each other.

In appraising Communist strength in Western Europe, Mr. Kirkpatrick sees a decline from the postwar peak. However, Communist propaganda operations have been steadily increasing. Broadcasts and publishing activities "continued at a high level of operation without any significant changes." The new Kremlin amiability may have led to a decrease of military and political tensions but the struggle for the minds of men continues unabated.

If this volume did no more than catalogue the many Communist front and friendship societies in the various regions of the world, through which Communist propaganda is funneled, it would be performing an encyclopedic service. Its scope is vast. Diligent research, compact organization, and effective presentation make this an excellent study and reference work.

Within the shadow of Soviet might, well beyond the possible protective shield of NATO and the West, lies Finland. Of all the nations situated along the Western periphery of the Soviet Union, it alone has succeeded in maintaining its independence. This political feat has been accomplished despite two severe military defeats administered by the U.S.S.R. during the 1939-1944 period. Finland's ability to conduct its own domestic affairs, while understandably tailoring its basic foreign policy orientation so as not to arouse Soviet suspicions or incur Soviet enmity, is sufficient testament to the courage, determination, and political maturity of its people. Respect for Finland has always been great in the West, particularly in the United States.

In *Finland: Between East and West*, Professor Anatole G. Mazour of Stanford University has written the best single volume work in English on the historical development of Finland's foreign relations. Relying heavily upon Finnish sources, Professor Mazour's narrative covers the critical events of Finland's experiences with Czarist and Soviet Russia with sound judgment and sensitivity for nuances of competing political forces. Stress is placed upon the post-1917 period, and the two wars of the 1939-1944 period with the Soviet Union are treated with feeling and objectivity.

Since 1946, Finland "has managed with amazing skill, poise, and diligence to pull through her gravest postwar crisis. The resettlement problem has been solved, the reparations paid, a favorable export trade enjoyed," and Finland remains determined to preserve its independence and stay at peace with its powerful neighbor. Whether it can succeed will depend in large measure upon circumstances beyond its control.

BOOKS IN BRIEF

AN INQUIRY INTO SOVIET MENTALITY (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. 113 pp., \$2.75) by GERHART NIEMEYER AND JOHN S. RECHETAR, JR., is an attempt to delve into the problematics of Soviet irrationality in the determination of substantive policy-making. The underlying assumption is that "the decision-making processes of Soviet bureaucracy reflect not rationality but a rationalization purely incidental to a wholly irrational clash of wills." From this central thesis, the authors proceed to the irrelevancy of Soviet ideology to reality, the propaganda and power rationale of the pseudo-scientific dialectic, and the irrational character of the Soviet leadership. They believe that Soviet motivations

and objectives constitute a bar to any meaningful intercourse. A short, provocative, though perhaps overdrawn, point of view.

STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY. BY RICHARD N. GARDNER (London: Oxford University Press, 1956. 423 pp., Bibliography and Index, \$6.75) is an excellent study of the Anglo-American attempt to reconstruct a liberal international system of trade and finance after the second World War and the currents of world politics in which it floundered and failed. With scholarship and keen analytical judgment, the author covers the significant developments and ideas of the prominent men who dominated the scene at Bretton Woods, the I.T.O. and G.A.T.T. and other early postwar economic conferences. But the scope of the book is even greater. This extremely well written volume is an invaluable case study of a particular phase of Anglo-American diplomacy, approached from the perspective of an economic historian.

THE ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. 338 pp., \$1.75) is a selection of documents compiled by the Columbia University Russian Institute dealing with the desanctification of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party and the early reactions of non-Soviet Communist leaders. Their statements reflect the confusion, dismay, and sense of uncertainty which permeated the Communist Parties of Western Europe and the United States during that period. A useful compilation which, with the possible return of discipline and conformity to the international communist movement, may someday provide insights of more than passing interest.

Selected History Titles . . .

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traces Arab history from its beginnings to 1956 when the Arabs find themselves independent, disunited, subject to powerful outside influence. ". . . a complicated situation reported without bias or fear of reprisal . . . top-class."—Carleton S. Coon. 30 ills., maps; 326 pp. \$5

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Norman A. Graebner. Also new—an interpretive study of U. S. politics and foreign policy since 1950. It shows how isolationist thought, based on an unrealistic concept of American invincibility, solidified under the stresses of the cold war—how it has

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World Documents

Suez Canal Users' Association

The following texts are a declaration of the establishment of a Suez Canal Users' Association and a statement issued by the second London Conference on the Suez crisis.

1

Representatives of the eighteen governments who joined in the proposals which were subsequently submitted to the Egyptian Government by the five-nation committee presided over by the Prime Minister of Australia, the Rt. Hon. Robert [Gordon] Menzies, as a basis for negotiating a settlement of the Suez Canal question, met in London from 19-21 September, 1956. Their purpose was to consider the situation in the light of the report of that committee, and other developments since the first London conference.

2

They noted with regret that the Egyptian Government did not accept these proposals and did not make any counter-proposals to the five-nation committee.

3

It is the view of this conference that these proposals still offer a fair basis for a peaceful solution of the Suez Canal problem, taking into account the interests of the user nations, as well as those of Egypt. The eighteen governments will continue their efforts to obtain such a settlement. The proposal made by the Egyptian Government on 10 September was placed before the conference, but it was considered too imprecise to afford a useful basis for discussion.

4

A declaration was drawn up providing for the establishment of a Suez Canal Users' Association. The text of this declaration is annexed hereto. This association is designed to facilitate any steps which may lead to a final or provisional solution of the Suez Canal problem. It will further cooperation between the governments adhering to it,

concerning the use of the canal. For this purpose it will seek the cooperation of the competent Egyptian authorities pending a solution of the larger issues. It will also deal with such problems as would arise if the traffic through the canal were to diminish or cease. The association will be established as a functioning entity at an early date after the delegates to this conference have had an opportunity to consult in relation thereto with their respective governments.

5

The conference noted that on 12 September, 1956, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France informed the Security Council of the United Nations of the situation, and that subsequently, on 17 September, the Government of Egypt also made a communication to the Security Council. The conference considers that recourse should be had to the United Nations whenever it seems that this would facilitate a settlement.

6

The representatives of the eighteen governments have found their cooperation at the conference valuable and constructive. The eighteen governments will continue to consult together in order to maintain a common approach to the problems which may arise out of the Suez question in the future.

7

It is the conviction of the conference that the course outlined in this statement is capable of producing by peaceful means a solution which is in conformity with the principles of justice and international law as declared in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DECLARATION ON ASSOCIATION

1

The members of the Suez Canal Users' Association (S. C. U. A.) shall be those nations which have participated in the second London Suez conference and which subscribe to the present declaration, and any other adhering nations which conform to criteria to be laid down hereafter by the association.

2

S. C. U. A. shall have the following purposes:

(1) To facilitate any steps which may lead to a final or provisional solution of the Suez Canal problem and to assist the members in the exercise of their rights as users of the Suez Canal in consonance with the 1888 Convention with due regard to the rights of Egypt.

(2) To promote safe, orderly, efficient and economical transit of the canal by vessels of any member nation desiring to avail themselves of the facilities of S. C. U. A. and to seek the cooperation of the competent Egyptian authorities for this purpose.

(3) To extend its facilities to vessels of non-member nations which desire to use them.

(4) To receive, hold and disperse the revenues accruing from the dues and other sums which any user of the canal may pay

to S. C. U. A., without prejudice to existing rights, pending a final settlement.

(5) To consider and report to members regarding any significant developments affecting the use or non-use of the canal.

(6) To assist in dealing with any practical problems arising from the failure of the Suez Canal adequately to serve its customary and intended purpose and to study forthwith means that may render it feasible to reduce dependence on the canal.

(7) To facilitate the execution of any provisional solution of the Suez problem that may be adopted by the United Nations.

3

To carry out the above-mentioned purposes:

(1) The members shall consult together in a council on which each member will be represented.

(2) The council shall establish an executive group to which it may delegate such powers as it deems appropriate.

(3) An administrator, who shall, *inter alia*, make the necessary arrangements with shipping interests, will be appointed to serve under the direction of the council through the executive group.

4

Membership may at any time be terminated by giving sixty days' notice.

The Text of the Constantinople Convention of 1888: Free Navigation of the Suez Canal

Following is the text of the Convention, guaranteeing free passage through the Suez Canal, signed by Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia and Turkey:

Article I

The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.

Consequently, the High Contracting Par-

ties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace.

The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties, recognizing that the Fresh-Water Canal is indispensable to the Maritime Canal, take note of the engagements of His Highness the Khedive towards the Universal Suez Canal Company as regards the Fresh-Water Canal; which engagements are stipulated in a Convention bearing date the 18th March, 1863, containing an *exposé* and four Articles.

They undertake not to interfere in any way with the security of that Canal and its branches, the working of which shall not be exposed to any attempt at obstruction.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties likewise undertake to respect the plant, establishments, buildings, and works of the Maritime Canal and of the Fresh-Water Canal.

Article IV

The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article I of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal, shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers.

Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores in the Canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. The transit of the afore-said vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible delay, in accordance with the Regulations in force, and without any other intermission than that resulting from the necessities of the service.

Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not exceed twenty-four hours, except in case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of twenty-four hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship belonging to the hostile Power.

Article V

In time of war belligerent Powers shall not disembark nor embark within the Canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions, or materials of war. But in case of an accidental hindrance in the Canal, men may be embarked or disembarked at the ports of access by detachments not exceeding 1,000 men, with a corresponding amount of war material.

Article VI

Prizes shall be subjected, in all respects, to the same rules as the vessels of war of belligerents.

Article VII

The Powers shall not keep any vessel of war in the waters of the Canal (including Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes).

Nevertheless, they may station vessels of war in the ports of access of Port Said and Suez, the number of which shall not exceed two for each Power.

This right shall not be exercised by belligerents.

Article VIII

The Agents in Egypt of the Signatory Powers of the present Treaty shall be charged to watch over its execution. In case of any event threatening the security or the free passage of the Canal, they shall meet on the summons of three of their number under the presidency of their Doyen [senior member], in order to proceed to the necessary verifications. They shall inform the Khedivial Government of the danger which they may have perceived, in order that that Government may take proper steps to insure the protection and the free use of the Canal. Under any circumstances, they shall meet once a year to take notice of the due execution of the Treaty.

The last-mentioned meetings shall take place under the presidency of a Special Commissioner nominated for that purpose by the Imperial Ottoman Government. A Commissioner of the Khedive may also take part in the meeting, and may preside over it in case of the absence of the Ottoman Commissioner.

They shall especially demand the suppression of any work or the dispersion of any

assemblage on either bank of the canal, the object or effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of the navigation.

Article IX

The Egyptian Government shall, within the limits of its powers resulting from the Firmans, and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty, take the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the said Treaty.

In case the Egyptian Government should not have sufficient means at its disposal, it shall call upon the Imperial Ottoman Government, which shall take the necessary measures to respond to such appeal; shall give notice thereof to the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of London of the 17th March, 1885; and shall, if necessary, concert with them on the subject.

The provisions of Articles IV, V, VII and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which shall be taken in virtue of the present Article.

Article X

Similarly, the provisions of Articles IV, V, VII and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order.

In case His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, or His Highness the Khedive, should find it necessary to avail themselves of the exceptions for which this Article provides, the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of London shall be notified thereof by the Imperial Ottoman Government.

It is likewise understood that the provisions of the four Articles aforesaid shall in no case occasion any obstacle to the measures which the Imperial Ottoman Government may think it necessary to take in order to insure by its own forces the defence of its other possessions situated on the eastern coast of the Red Sea.

Article XI

The measures which shall be taken in the

cases provided for by Articles IX and X of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the free use of the Canal. In the same cases, the erection of permanent fortifications contrary to the provisions of Article VIII is prohibited.

Article XII

The High Contracting Parties, by application of the principle of equality as regards the free use of the Canal, a principle which forms one of the bases of the present Treaty, agree that none of them shall endeavour to obtain with respect to the Canal territorial or commercial advantages or privileges in any international arrangements which may be concluded. Moreover, the rights of Turkey as the territorial Power are reserved.

Article XIII

With the exception of the obligations expressly provided by the clauses of the present Treaty, the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and the rights and immunities of His Highness the Khedive, resulting from the Firmans, are in no way affected.

Article XIV

The High Contracting Parties agree that the engagements resulting from the present Treaty shall not be limited by the duration of the Acts of Concession of the Universal Suez Canal Company.

Article XV

The stipulations of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the sanitary measures in force in Egypt.

Article XVI

The High Contracting Parties undertake to bring the present Treaty to the knowledge of the States which have not signed it, inviting them to accede to it.

Article XVII

The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Constantinople, within the space of one month, or sooner if possible.

In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty, and have affixed to it the seal of their arms.

Done at Constantinople, the 29th day of the month of October, in the year 1888.

Received At Our Desk

History and Politics

THE CRUCIAL DECADE: AMERICA, 1945-1955. BY ERIC F. GOLDMAN. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. 298 pages and index, \$4.00).

Here is a vivid account of the past 10 years in America. The author has recaptured the prevailing mood and tempo which accompanied events in this period. Here are described, with their original color, the Truman years, Jackie Robinson as the first Negro in baseball, the labor strikes, television and Senator Kefauver, the dismissal of West Point Cadets for cheating. In this hectic postwar decade the United States adjusts itself to prosperous and relatively peaceful times.

AFRICA'S CHALLENGE TO AMERICA.

BY CHESTER BOWLES. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956. 134 pages and index, \$2.75).

In his usual lucid and compelling style, Chester Bowles sums up African problems: the conflicting solutions offered by Africans, both white and black, and by foreigners; the differing administrations in Africa; the missionary views; the strategic and military implications of African unrest. Three forces that influence African politics and the relations of the rest of the world to Africa are: the "Revolution of Rising Expectations"; the need for African raw materials; and the implications of the Cold War. Chester Bowles attacks "our present policy of negativism" and its influence on our actions in the United Nations when questions of trusteeship or colonial policy are discussed. "For the framework of an American policy in Africa we can do no better, I believe, than to turn to Secretary of State Cordell Hull . . .," he concludes. In particular, he suggests following Hull's proposal for

setting individual target dates for self-determination of the African states, despite the difficulties of such a program.

PROSPERO AND CALIBAN. A STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COLONISATION. BY O. MANNONI. Translated by Pamela Powesland. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. 209 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.25).

First published in French in 1950, this is an analysis in psychiatric terms of the problem of colonialism that confronts the West today. Dr. Mannoni was formerly head of the General Information Department of the French administration in Madagascar. His analysis is profoundly at odds with the theory of economic determinism and with the historical interpretation of nineteenth and twentieth century colonial problems. Drawing parallels between "The Tempest" and "Robinson Crusoe," Dr. Mannoni offers provocative reading for the student of colonial history, of social psychology or anthropology.

A MILITARY HISTORY OF MODERN CHINA. BY F. F. LIU. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. 286 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.00).

Out of a background that includes combat and staff service with the Chinese Nationalists and a doctorate at Princeton University, F. F. Liu has written an account of military developments in China from the founding of China's first military school, the Whampoa Academy, under the leadership of the young General Chiang Kai-shek, to the flight of the Nationalists to Formosa. The early cooperation and the friction between the Right and Left wing factions in the Kuomintang, the influence first of Russian and then of German military advisors is carefully

chronicled; American influence in China after 1941 is detailed. Here is a scholarly analysis of the conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists in China. Of the Communists, the author notes that "Theirs was a fine fighting force," but continues that "in the communist conquest of the vast mainland of China much of their success must be attributed to the default of the Chinese nationalist military power—a great military force taxed by eight years of supreme effort against Imperial Japan and betrayed from within by corruption in high places."

THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN LIFE. EDITED BY ANDREW S. BERKY. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 126 pages, \$2.75).

First presented in lecture form at the Schwenkfelder Library, Pennsburg, Pennsylvania, these essays by a group of well known Americans may stimulate further discussion of the major problems Americans face today. "Science and Industry" is treated by Gaylord P. Harnwell; "Spiritual Man," by Ralph Cooper Hutchison; "The Democratic Process," by James MacGregor Burns; "Individual Freedom," by Henry Steele Commager; "World Peace" by Joseph E. Johnson. Throughout, the authors stress what is best and unique in American thought and American history, and evaluate the responsibilities Americans must face in a thermo-nuclear age. As Dr. Johnson notes, "The point is that world peace does become a challenge to life on this earth, not just to American life."

THE OUTSIDER. BY COLIN WILSON. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956. 288 pages with notes, \$4.00).

Colin Wilson, who shows amazing erudition for his 25 years, explores the personality of the Outsider by analyzing literary figures such as Raskolnikov, Roquentin, Meursault, and their counterparts in real life, the mentally tortured, the Nietzsches, Nijinskys and Van Goghs. The Outsider is not a single identifiable person, but the embodiment of the quali-

ties of the sensitive intellectual, the artist, and the man of vision.

Some of the author's insights and observations on the writings discussed in this book are lucid and penetrating. However, he seems more interested in examining actual and fictional characters than in the problem, and its possible solution, of the Outsider who has not gained the maturity to live with himself.

SOURCE MATERIALS

DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY. Series D (1937-1945), Volume IX. The War Years. March 18—June 22, 1940. Washington: Department of State Publication 6312. 689 pages, appendices and index, \$3.25).

These 689 pages of documents covering a span of a little more than three months in the field of German foreign policy may well provide richer fare in source materials than the historian can appreciate. These were historic months; as the preface points out: "This volume opens with the meeting at the Brenner Pass on March 18, 1940, where Hitler disclosed to Mussolini his plans for the offensive in the West, and ends with the signing of the armistice with France at Compiegne on June 22, 1940." The roster of editors on this study is as impressive as their achievement in selecting and editing the documents.

DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST. A Documentary Record. BY J. C. HUREWITZ. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956. Vol. I, 1535-1914, 286 pages and index, \$5.00; Vol. II, 1914-1956, 421 pages and index, \$6.50).

Although the author maintains that this is not an "exhaustive collection," his chronological arrangement of the material, his introductory notes and bibliographical references that preface the documents, his careful selection of materials combine to add depth and stature. Having struggled without success to secure a copy of the recent Egypt-Yemen-Saudi Arabian military agreement for CURRENT HISTORY readers, this reviewer appreciates the manifold difficulties in the collection of this material.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Arms and West Europe

September 15—Meeting in Paris, the 7 members of the Western Europe Union agree that before any of them reduce conventional arms there should be prior accord. The meeting was called at the request of West Germany.

September 18—Meeting in special session, the North Atlantic Council issues a communiqué questioning the West German decision to require one year of military service for conscripts instead of 18 months.

Atomic Energy Conference

September 20—Representatives from 81 states attend a U.N. atomic energy conference to approve the article of incorporation of the proposed international atomic energy agency.

French-German Relations

September 29—Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany and Premier Guy Mollet of France conclude an agreement to return the Saar to Germany. Political union of the Saar with Germany will precede economic unity; France's economic interests in the Saar will slowly diminish.

Israeli-Arab Dispute

September 5—Israel criticizes Egypt's action in the Suez crisis.

September 13—A mounting series of incidents occasions a warning from U. N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to the Middle Eastern states to honor the seven-year-old Palestine armistice agreements.

September 22—Finance Minister Levi Eshkol

of Israel warns that the Suez crisis has aggravated the possibility of an attack against Israel.

September 26—Israel's Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, says that Israel is reaffirming her pledge to maintain a cease fire and explains that the Israeli attack on Jordanian Army positions September 25 was "an inevitable consequence of a chain of murders and aggressions committed by Jordanian forces. . . ."

September 28—Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld warns that the Israel-Arab conflict is "deeply disturbing."

September 30—Lebanon asks that a conference of Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon meet to mobilize their forces in order to retaliate against Israeli reprisal raids.

Japanese-Russian Relations

September 10—Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu declares that the U. S. has given full support to Japan in the dispute with the Soviet Union over control of the Kurile Islands.

September 28—Japan and Russia agree to postpone discussion of the disputed Kurile Islands claimed by Japan and held by the Soviet Union, in order to negotiate a peace treaty ending World War II. The five point plan advanced by Japan and accepted in Moscow calls for: 1. An end to the state of war; 2. Establishment of full diplomatic relations; 3. Execution of the earlier fishing agreement; 4. Russian support for Japan's membership in the U. N.; 5. Return of Japanese prisoners of war still held by the Soviet Union.

Russian-Yugoslav Relations

September 19—Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, arrives in Belgrade, ostensibly as a private visitor.

- September 23—It is revealed in Warsaw that the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party has written a letter containing sharp criticism of Yugoslav communism.
- September 27—Following conferences between Khrushchev and Yugoslav President Tito at Brioni Island, Tito flies with Khrushchev to Sevastopol and motors to Yalta.
- September 29—A spokesman for the Yugoslav Foreign Minister in Belgrade, Brank Draskovic, reveals that Tito and Khrushchev are discussing "open questions" concerning "state and party relations." Differences "of an ideological nature" are being explored.
- September 30—Hungary's Communist leader, Erno Gero, and Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin join Khrushchev and Tito for secret conferences at Yalta.

The Suez Crisis

- September 2—President Gamal Abdel Nasser says that he will accept "any solution to the Suez Canal question that does not affect our sovereignty."
- French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau says that France will use force against Egypt if necessary.
- September 3—Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies of Australia meets Egyptian President Nasser to discuss the proposals for international control of the Suez Canal advocated by 18 of the 22 nations at the recent London Conference.
- September 7—Prime Minister Menzies calls a "complete end" to his discussions with President Nasser unless Nasser wants to discuss a possible settlement of the Suez dispute again.
- U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles meets twice with British and French diplomats because of the failure of the Menzies talks in Cairo.
- September 8—The Menzies Committee reveals that it has planned another session with Nasser.
- Premier Guy Mollet of France and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau accept a British invitation to discuss the Suez crisis in London.
- September 9—Saying that the situation is "very, very grave," Prime Minister Menzies ends his meetings with Egypt's President. A joint communiqué indicates the failure of the conference.
- September 10—Egypt proposes that a special negotiating body be set up to work out a settlement for the Suez dispute.
- September 11—Prime Minister Eden and Premier Mollet agree to apply economic pressure on Egypt to force her to accept international control of the Suez Canal.
- President Eisenhower says that the U. S. will not approve the use of force in the Suez "under present circumstances."
- September 12—Addressing an emergency session of Parliament, Prime Minister Eden reveals that the U. S., France and Great Britain have agreed to set up a Suez Canal operating authority—an organization of nations using the Canal.
- An Egyptian spokesman says the suggestion for establishing a "users' association" is an effort to "provoke war."
- September 13—Egypt declares that she can run the Canal without outside aid.
- Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru warns that there is "grave risk" of war in the users' association plan for the Suez Canal.
- Secretary of State Dulles declares that if Egypt will not allow users' association ships to go through the Canal the U. S. will detour its shipping around Africa.
- September 14—Egypt takes over complete operation of the Canal after 400 foreign employees, including pilots, leave their jobs.
- September 15—The Soviet Union offers to send pilots to help Egypt with the operation of the Canal.
- The Soviet Union charges that the Western powers plan "an act of aggression" against Egypt in violation of Russian interests and the U. N. Charter.
- September 17—Five nations of the 15 invited to the next London Conference indicate opposition to the users' association plan: Pakistan, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, and Iran.
- Egypt charges that the proposed users' association violates the U. N. charter and the Constantinople Convention of 1888

(for further information see pp. 306-308 of this issue).

September 18—Egypt's Suez Canal Administration Chief declares that "the pilot crisis is over."

September 19—Five nations oppose a boycott of the Canal: Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark.

Premier Bulganin of the U.S.S.R. announces that Russia is willing to meet with Egypt, India and the Western Big Three to discuss the Suez crisis.

September 21—The conference in London ends; a draft plan for a Suez Canal Users' Association is announced.

September 22—Britain issues invitations to 18 nations for a third conference on the Suez.

France decides to join the Users' Association "with reservations."

September 23—Prime Minister Nehru of India criticizes Egypt for her methods in nationalizing the Suez Canal company.

Britain and France take the Suez dispute to the Security Council. The case will be presented as a "situation" not a "dispute," so that Britain can vote in the Security Council.

September 24—Egypt files a counter-claim on the Suez Question with the Security Council.

Saudi Arabia and Syria pledge full support for Egypt in the Suez dispute.

September 25—The U. S. notifies Egypt's Canal Authority that Soviet pilots will not be allowed on U. S. warships in the Canal.

September 26—The Security Council decides to debate the British-French complaint and the Egyptian counter-complaint about the Suez controversy.

September 27—Prime Minister Nehru of India and King Saud of Saudi Arabia declare that pressure on Egypt will "only retard" settlement of the Suez dispute.

Prime Minister Eden, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, Premier Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau announce that they plan continuing cooperation during the Suez crisis, at the end of long discussions.

September 30—Eighteen nations plan to at-

tend the Suez Canal Users' Association opening in London October 1.

United Nations

September 20—India's Ambassador to Japan, Binay Ranjan Sen, is elected Director General of the U. N. Food and Agricultural Organization, succeeding Philip V. Cardon of the U. S.

AFGHANISTAN

September 4—News reaches New Delhi that the Premier of Afghanistan, Prince Mohammed Daud Khan, announced on August 25 that the Afghan Government has signed military aid agreements with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

September 21—The Afghan Government lifts the month-old ban on the entry of *New York Times* correspondents.

ARGENTINE

September 1—Provisional President General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu begins an intensive study of the nation's wage problems.

September 4—About 150,000 metal workers inaugurate a series of work stoppages demanding a 90 per cent increase in hourly wage rates.

September 13—Argentine ports are closed as 15,000 maritime workers begin a 24-hour strike.

September 14—The General Confederation of Commercial Workers' million-man white collar strike ends after 20 hours. The strike was called to protest employers' proposals in deadlocked negotiations.

September 17—The Export-Import Bank reveals that it will give up to \$100,000,000 in credits to Argentina to help in the recovery program.

AUSTRIA

September 25—Chancellor Julius Raab accuses Italy of violating a 1-year agreement prohibiting discrimination against German-speaking people in the Italian Tyrol.

BOLIVIA

September 25—The Government institutes a state of siege throughout the country and bans all public meetings as a result of the riots last week.

September 26—The "revolutionary Congress" begins a study of a constitution for the "workers."

BRAZIL

September 1—Brazil abrogates its atomic agreements with the United States. The abrogation is regarded as "a historical victory" by the Communists and the nationalists.

September 10—Deputy Tarcilio Vieira de Melo, Government Party leader in the Chamber of Deputies, assures Congress that no other Opposition newspapers or magazines will be seized by the police.

September 22—General Augusto Magessi da Cunha Pereira, chief of the Federal police, resigns because he will not obey a court order to return copies of an opposition magazine he confiscated two weeks ago.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Canada

September 19—Construction begins on Canada's first nuclear power plant at Des Joachims on the Ottawa River.

September 21—George Drew, leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, resigns because of ill health.

Great Britain

September 2—Prime Minister Anthony Eden announces the appointment of Viscount Hailsham as First Lord of the Admiralty, succeeding Viscount Cilecennin.

September 5—The Trades Union Congress refuses to follow the Government's plea to be restrained in pressing for higher wages.

Sept. 6—The Trades Union Congress approves a resolution barring force in the Suez crisis unless the U. N. consents.

September 13—Prime Minister Eden announces that his Government will appeal the Suez dispute to the U. N.

September 29—Clement Davies, 72 year old Liberal party leader, resigns in favor of a younger man.

India

September 5—India and Burma sign a 5-year trade agreement to increase mutual commerce.

The lower house of the East Punjab Legislature approves drastic censorship on newspapers published within the state.

September 7—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru expresses public appreciation in Parliament for U. S. aid.

September 9—In its annual report, the Reserve Bank of India reports significant improvement in India's economic situation under the first 5-year plan.

September 10—India asks the U.N. General Assembly to review the question of South Africa's treatment of persons of Indian origin. It is reported that the enforcement of the Group Areas Act in South Africa will cost Indians in Johannesburg, for example, 22 million pounds worth of property; in the town of Vryburg, persons of Indian origin are to be resettled on a site adjacent to the town's sewage disposal plant, with an Indian loss of properties amounting to some 411 thousand pounds.

Pakistan

September 6—A new Cabinet is sworn in in East Pakistan, headed by Aatur Rehman Khan.

September 8—Prime Minister Mohammed Ali resigns after a year in office, because of internal conflict.

September 10—Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy, former Leader of the Opposition in Parliament, is asked to form a coalition government. He is leader of the Awami (People's) League.

September 12—Pakistan's Fifth Prime Minister, Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy, is sworn in and turns to the problem of food shortages immediately.

September 20—The East Pakistan Assembly repeals the Public Safety Act that provides for detention without trial.

September 26—The new Government announces that Pakistan will stand by all its treaty commitments with the West.

British Colombia

September 20—Premier W. A. C. Bennett wins a landslide victory for the third time in four years; the Administrator's Social Credit party seems certain of 38 seats in the 52 seat legislature.

Cyprus

September 5—The Cypriote Orthodox Church protests the arrest of Nicos Kranidiotis, the general secretary of the Ethnarchy, the "inner cabinet" of the Church.

September 6—The main armed French contingent for possible use in the Suez crisis arrives in Cyprus. There will be an estimated 5500 troops in the French task force.

September 14—Because of the Suez crisis, the British stiffen the terms under which they will accept self-rule for Cyprus.

September 21—Three more Cypriote terrorists are hanged, for violence and murder.

The Gold Coast

September 18—The British Government announces that the Gold Coast will become independent on March 6, 1957, subject to Parliamentary approval.

September 21—Opposition parties accept Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah's suggestion that they work out a constitution with the Government before independence. The Gold Coast will take on the historic West African Negro name "Ghana."

Northern Rhodesia

September 12—A state of emergency is declared in the copper belt because of striking natives protesting racial discrimination.

Trinidad

September 25—In the elections for Legislative Council, the Peoples National Movement takes 13 of 24 elective seats; Dr Eric E. Williams is asked to form a Government. The East Indian party of Bhadaes Sagan Maraj was defeated by Dr. Williams' predominantly Negro party.

BURMA

September 6—Authoritative sources in Bangkok reveal that Burma plans to place her border dispute with China before the next session of the U. N. General Assembly.

September 16—The newspaper *Nation* reports that 900 Chinese Communist troops have pushed into Burma along a 60-mile front.

CHINA (The Peoples Republic)

September 1—Communist China protests the "intrusion" of U. S. planes searching for survivors of the Navy patrol plane shot down by the Chinese.

September 2—Communist China admits that it shot down a U. S. plane but rejects U. S. demands for compensation as "unjustified."

September 7—The U. S. and Chinese delegates meet for the 57th time to discuss U. S. prisoners in Red China and the question of renouncing force in the Taiwan area.

September 15—The Chinese Communist Eighth Party Congress opens in Peiping.

Mao Tse-tung says that there is "a trend toward relaxation of tension in the international situation."

September 16—Premier Chou En-lai announces that Communist China plans to increase total national income by 50 per cent during the years of the Second Five Year Plan, 1958-1962.

The Chinese Communists approve a new Constitution, which does not mention Mao Tse-tung. The Party Congress, elected for a 5-year term, is to meet yearly.

September 24—The Government announces

that diplomatic relations have been established with Yemen.

CHINA (Taiwan)

September 11—Chinese Nationalist Minister of Economic Affairs, Kiang Piao, announces that a new four-year economic plan will begin in 1958, after the "glowing success" of the current plan.

COLOMBIA

September 12—The new official newspaper *Diario Oficial* reveals that the Cabinet has resigned, following the resignation of Evaristo Sourdes, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Carlos Villaveces, Minister of Finance, for personal reasons and reasons of health, respectively.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

September 24—Parliament opens its fall session by passing a law reducing the work week from 48 to 46 hours, beginning October 1. Children under 16 can work only 36 hours a week, according to the new law.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, THE

September 11—In an effort to discredit Dr. Jesus de Galindez, Generalissimo Rafael L. Trujillo asserts that the missing Spanish-Basque lecturer at Columbia University offered him a manuscript denouncing his regime for \$25,000. Galindez disappeared six months ago today.

EGYPT (See also *INTERNATIONAL, The Suez Canal*)

September 16—In Washington, the U. S. Department of Commerce reports that Egypt's sales of cotton behind the Iron Curtain increased her export earnings 35.6 per cent above the first half of 1955. Egypt arranged to trade cotton for arms after the U. S. refused to furnish weapons for her.

September 18—Egypt declares a virtual boycott against Western trade.

September 21—President Gamal Abdel Nasser reveals plans to meet King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia and President Shukry al-Kuwatly of Syria in Saudi Arabia to discuss the Suez crisis.

September 24—Leaders of Saudi Arabia, and Syria announce complete support for Egypt in the Suez crisis.

FRANCE

September 12—French and German officials reveal that there is only one point still in dispute on the draft of a treaty for the Saar and related questions.

September 14—It is announced by Morocco's Finance Minister that France has agreed to provide more than \$68 million to help balance the Moroccan budget.

September 18—Food strikes begin in Paris as dealers protest official limits on profit margins and bakers protest ceilings on the price of bread.

September 21—It is reported that the bakers association has advised its members to reopen, promising to carry on the fight for higher prices with other means.

THE FRENCH EMPIRE

Algeria

September 3—French sources reveal that more than three thousand civilians have been killed by Algerian rebels since the fighting began on November 1, 1954.

September 6—Robert Lacoste, French Minister residing in Algeria, declares that 200,000 men have landed in Algeria in the past three months, bringing French forces there up to 400,000.

September 13—The National Liberation Front orders a general boycott of the Algerian public schools.

September 25—Fifteen Arab, Asian and African states ask the U. N. General Assembly to consider the Algerian question in its forthcoming session.

September 26—The French Cabinet defers consideration of the Algerian question

pending clarification of the Suez dispute.

French Togoland

September 5—The French Togoland Territorial Assembly meets for the first time as a Legislative Assembly, following the French Cabinet's approval of 20 amendments on the proposed new Constitution. In accord with the amendments, France has declared the territory a republic, has appointed an Acting High Commissioner and has announced plans for holding an election for a Premier and Council of Ministers.

September 7—Nicholas Grunitzky, Togoland Deputy in the French National Assembly, is selected as Premier-designate of the French Togoland Republic.

September 10—The French Togoland Assembly approves the appointment of Nicholas Grunitzky as Premier, and approves his program for rapid social and economic development.

GERMANY

September 1—Bishop Otto Spuelbeck, apostolic administrator of the Meissen Diocese in East Germany, pledges the support of the Roman Catholic Church of Germany for the restoration of national unity.

September 7—West Germany renews its attempt to persuade the Soviet Union to agree to free elections as a prerequisite of reunification, in a memorandum delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at Bonn.

September 19—East Germany accuses the Bonn government of provoking a series of border incidents and asserts that West Germany is creating "deliberate tension" on the border.

September 24—After 11 years, West German Air Force planes take to the air at a United States Air Force base in Bavaria.

September 27—The West German Cabinet approves a law providing for one year of military service for West Germany's new conscripts instead of 18 months of service.

GUATEMALA

September 24—The National Democratic

Movement, the government party, wins elections to fill vacant Congress seats, insuring continued 100 per cent control of President Carlos Castillo Armas' regime, which controls all 66 seats. Government candidates ran unopposed.

HUNGARY

September 19—The Hungarian newspaper *Szabad Nep* reports that the first delivery of equipment and machinery for a nuclear reactor has arrived in Hungary from the Soviet Union.

INDONESIA

September 12—President Sukarno is welcomed in Moscow at the start of a 6-day state visit.

September 15—A government edict is promulgated banning newspapers from publishing threats or insinuations against the President, Vice-President, Government officials and Cabinet members.

Details of a Soviet offer of \$100 million in economic and technical aid are made public. Capital goods, machinery and heavy equipment will be included, at 2.5 per cent interest, to be repaid in raw materials over a 10 to 12 year period.

September 21—President Sukarno says the Russian loan should be regarded "purely from a business angle."

ISRAEL (See also *INTERNATIONAL, Israeli-Arab Dispute*)

September 21—Canada announces that she will sell 24 Sabre jet fighter planes to Israel.

ITALY

September 6—French Socialist Senator Pierre Commin leaves Rome after completing his mission of preparing for a fusion of the two Italian Socialist parties: Guiseppa Saragat's Democratic Socialists, who are anti-Communist, and Pietro Nenni's Left-wing Socialists, allies of the Communists.

JAPAN (See *INTERNATIONAL, Japanese-Russian Relations*)

JORDAN (*See INTERNATIONAL, Israeli-Arab Dispute*)

September 4—King Hussein invites the Presidents of Syria and Lebanon to join him in a conference on Arab problems.

September 19—Foreign Minister Awni Abdelhadi reveals that Jordan plans to protest to the Security Council that Israel is concentrating troops near her border.

KOREA

September 28—A former South Korean Army sergeant shoots at Vice-President John M. Chang, leader of the principal political opposition in Korea. Dr. Chang is wounded in the hand.

MEXICO

September 6—Mexico begins a multi-million dollar campaign to eliminate malaria.

NEPAL

September 24—A Chinese-Nepalese treaty is published, including Nepal's surrender of extraterritorial rights in Tibet and her recognition of Chinese sovereignty there.

NICARAGUA

September 22—President Anastasio Somoza is shot at a dance in Leon.

September 23—200 members of the Opposition are held for questioning in connection with the shooting.

September 29—President Somoza dies; his son Luis is unanimously elected to succeed him, to serve until May, 1957.

POLAND

September 6—Premier Josef Cryankiewicz says that no foreign observers except news correspondents may attend the Poznan trials.

September 27—The Poznan trials begin.

EL SALVADOR

September 14—Lieut. Col. José Maria Lemus

is inaugurated as President of El Salvador.

SWEDEN

September 16—Unofficial returns from the parliamentary elections show that the Social Democrats in coalition with the Agrarians will retain control of the Government.

U.S.S.R., THE

September 3—The U. S. Atomic Energy Commission announces that the Soviet Union has exploded a third nuclear blast in its current test series.

September 7—By a decision of the Supreme Soviet Parliament of the Soviet Union, the prizes formerly known as Stalin Peace Prizes will now be known as International Lenin Prizes for Strengthening Peace among Peoples.

September 8—The Government announces that a minimum wage law will go into effect January 1, 1957. No worker will receive less than \$67.50 monthly.

September 10—It is announced in Belgrade that the Soviet Union has promised 300,000 tons of wheat to Yugoslavia in the next two months.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

September 21—Secretary of Agriculture Benson exempts from penalty payments those farmers who violated their 1956 soil bank contracts by harvesting crops from their acreage reserves. The penalty for violation of soil bank commitments is 50 per cent of the farmer's soil bank payments. According to Mr. Benson, farmers misunderstood their commitments under the soil bank plan because of the haste with which it was put into effect this year.

September 28—Farm prices drop one-half of one per cent while prices paid by farmers fall one-third of one per cent. This is the third month in which farm prices have taken a drop.

The Economy

September 2—Employment in August reached an all-time high of 66.8 million, a rise of 100,000 over that of July, Secretary of Labor Mitchell announces.

September 20—The Government acts to ease mortgage credit and to reduce the down payments for buyers of low priced housing.

Foreign Policy

September 3—Talks between the United States and the Philippines on military bases are halted because of disagreement over which country is to have legal jurisdiction over personnel in military areas.

September 24—President Eisenhower's report on the Mutual Security Program reveals that the Far East received \$760 million in non-military aid out of the \$1.5 billion earmarked for non-military foreign aid.

The Department of State refuses to discuss the easing of trade restrictions with Communist China while American prisoners are still held by the Chinese government.

Government

September 2—A small Indian tribe, the Wyandottes of Oklahoma, regain their two-acre tract of burial ground in the heart of Kansas City's business center. The land was ceded by Congress in the closing session this year without the knowledge of Kansas legislators opposed to this scheme. The Indians expect to sell the land back to the city for \$1.5 million.

September 8—A Senate subcommittee questions the transfer of the disarmament problem from the State Department to the White House. The name of Harold Stassen, special assistant to the President on disarmament, is not mentioned.

September 10—The State Department reorganizes its handling of African Affairs. The office of African Affairs is divided into the Office of Northern African Affairs and the Office of Southern African Affairs.

It is revealed that oil companies who lobbied last winter to free natural gas from direct federal controls sent telegrams in support of the bill to senators signed by their constituents without the constituents' consent. The Standard Oil Company of Indiana financed the telegram campaign and charged it to "marketing" expenses.

September 11—Federal tax agents study the oil companies' "educational campaign" to promote the passage of the natural gas bill in an attempt to learn whether contributions to this campaign are deductible; lobbying contributions are not.

September 19—The Seneca Indians oppose the building of the \$100 million Allegheny reservoir; 9000 acres of the reservation—with 90 per cent of their population—would be subject to flooding.

September 22—One year after his heart attack the President is back on full schedule according to Press Secretary Hagerty.

September 28—A federal judge dismisses the denaturalization proceedings against Frank Costello on the basis that the wiretap evidence used in the government's case is illegal.

September 29—Harvey Matusow, Communist informer "who lied even when telling the truth," is found guilty on all 5 perjury counts charged against him, and is sentenced to 5 years in prison.

Politics

September 10—With the largest number of votes ever received by a Maine Governor, Democrat Edmund S. Muskie of Maine rolls up a vote of 179,697 to 123,784 to keep his office.

September 12—The general board of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. endorses Democratic candidates Adlai Stevenson and Estes Kefauver for president and vice-president.

In the Maine election, Frank M. Coffin is elected as the first Democratic Representative from Maine in 22 years; the state impounds the ballots cast for Republican Representative Robert Hale's seat; because of his narrow lead—28 votes over the Democratic contender—there will be a recount.

September 13—The Communist party of the United States adopts a draft resolution at the meeting of its National Committee to be submitted to its national convention next February 11-14. The resolution confesses past mistakes and proposes party reforms.

September 15—President Eisenhower sends an open letter to state and local party leaders urging them to work for the election of a Republican Congress.

September 17—Disagreeing with former President Truman, Adlai Stevenson states his belief that Alger Hiss was guilty of perjury when he denied the passing of government documents to an admitted Soviet spy. Stevenson hopes to eliminate the political issue of communism in government with this statement.

September 19—Adlai E. Stevenson wins the official endorsement of the United Steelworkers of America.

September 26—Vice-President Nixon reveals his honorary membership in the NAACP and urges a moderate but "steady" pace towards integration.

September 27—President Eisenhower announces that he plans to campaign a little harder to satisfy his friends. However, he refuses to barnstorm or whistlestop.

Segregation

September 1—Volunteer police employ tear gas bombs to dispel a Clinton, Tennessee, mob riot over the integration of Negroes with whites in the Clinton High School.

September 2—The Tennessee National Guard with full combat equipment is called into Clinton to enforce law and order.

September 4—Nine Negroes attend Clinton High School for the first time without incident and walk home unmolested.

In Mansfield, Texas, crowds gather at the high school to prevent Negroes from enrolling. Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black denies the petition of the trustees of the Mansfield School district to stay the execution of a Federal Court of Appeals mandate ordering integration.

September 5—Pupils attend the Mansfield

High School (Texas) without mob disorder. However, no Negro students attempt to attend.

President Eisenhower states that he is pledged to support the Supreme Court decision on segregation; at the same time he opposes federal intervention in the school desegregation problem unless the states prove unwilling to resist mob violence.

September 6—National Guardsmen with bayonets lead 9 Negro students into the Sturgis (Kentucky) High School through a 500-man mob.

September 7—The nine Negro students fail to appear for classes at the Sturgis High School (Kentucky) despite the protection of National Guardsmen.

September 12—The National Guard enters the town of Clay, Kentucky, in the middle of the night to escort 2 Negro children to school. All the white children walk out.

September 17—The Clay Consolidated School (Kentucky) closes its doors to 4 Negro pupils. They plan to enroll at the all-Negro school in nearby Providence.

September 18—The Union County School Board (Kentucky) votes to bar Negro students from public schools. This means that the 8 Negro students attending the Sturgis High School will no longer be admitted.

September 28—The week-old anti-integration boycott of Henderson County schools comes to a close as the state attorney general rules that leaders of the boycott can be prosecuted.

Supreme Court

September 7—Associate Justice Sherman Minton announces his retirement from the Supreme Court on October 15.

September 29—William Joseph Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, is appointed to the United States Supreme Court as an Associate Justice by President Eisenhower. Justice Brennan is a Democrat and Roman Catholic; 50 years old, he is the youngest jurist on the bench.

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